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NOTES
PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION FOR HANDICAPPED
PERSONS UNDER SECTION 503 OF THE
REHABILITATION ACT
INTRODUCTION
Of all minorities, the twenty-eight million handicapped persons
in the United States suffer the most severe limitations on employ-
ment opportunity.' The impact of these limitations is apparent from
the fact that among the working-age population approximately two-
thirds of the blind, more than one-half of all paraplegics, and over
three-fourths of persons with epilepsy are unemployed.2 The precise
number of persons with handicapping conditions more or less severe
than those mentioned who are unemployed or underemployed
because of their handicaps is impossible to determine Congress
recognized the severe employment problems of the disabled as a
national problem responsible for economic waste and social disloca-
tion.' Congress also recognized that employment barriers were also
barriers to integration of handicapped persons into society.'
1. See ten Broek & Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CAL.
L. REV. 809 (1966); see generally Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treat-
ment: The Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class" Under the
Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 855, 861-68 (1975). Congress estimated
that the number of adult persons with handicapping physical or mental conditions
ranges from 28 million to 50 million. S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1974),
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373 (hereinafter S. REP. No. 1297].
2. 118 CONG. REC. 3321 (1972). See also Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 1,
at 864; Note, Potluck Protections for Handicapped Discriminatees: The Need to
Amend Title VII to Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, 8 Loy. CH. L.
REV. 814, 815 (1975).
3. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, which reported the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-94 (1976), noted the lack of accurate information on
the problems of handicapped persons:
There is no more devastating comment on the nature of our public policy
or the lives of these [handicapped individuals] than society's inability to
provide accurate and current figures on how many individuals are hand-
icapped, what forms of disability they have, and what kind of services
they receive or need.
S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 1, at 28.
4. S. REP. No. 318, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 26, reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076 [hereinafter S. REP. No. 318].
5. Id.
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Over a sixty year period, Congress responded to the employ-
ment problems of handicapped persons through the enactment of a
series of laws, culminating in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.6 The
Rehabilitation Act establishes a number of comprehensive programs
aimed at the rehabilitation of physically and mentally handicapped
persons for the purpose of increasing their opportunities to engage
in gainful employment.' The Act provides for general rehabilitation
services,8 architectural modifications for the accommodation of hand-
icapped persons, 9 research on handicapping conditions,"0 and training
of both handicapped persons and rehabilitation personel." That Con-
gress intended these services to enhance handicapped persons'
employment prospects is evidenced by the Act's definition of a hand-
icapped person as one who: "A) has a physical or mental disability
which for such individual constitutes or results in a substantial hand-
icap to employment and B) can reasonably be expected to benefit in
terms of employability from vocational rehabilitation services . ... '"'
Moreover, an express purpose of the Act is to increase and expand
employment opportunities for handicapped individuals in the public
and private sectors."1
Title V of the Rehabilitation Act, particularly Sections 501, 503
and 504, mounts a direct tripartite attack on handicap employment
6. The earliest of these laws was the Smith-Fess Act, ch. 219 § 1, 41 Stat.
735 (1920) (repealed 1973) (offered training, counseling, and placement services for
physically handicapped persons). The Smith-Fess Act was later supplemented by the
Vocational Rehabilitation Amendments to the Social Security Act, ch. 190 § 1, 57 Stat.
374 (1943) (repealed 1973) (extended rehabilitation services to the mentally impaired;
redefined rehabilitation services as "any services necessary to render a disabled in-
dividual fit to engage in a remunerative occupation." Id. at § 10). See Vocational
Rehabilitation Amendments at Pub. L. No. 90-391, 82 Stat. 297 (1968) (repealed 1973);
Pub. L. No. 89-333, 79 Stat. 1282 (1965) (repealed 1973); ch. 655 § 2, 68 Stat. 652 (repealed
1973) (These amendments generally increased federal support for and expanded
rehabilitation services). The Rehabilitation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 357 (1973)
is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-94 (1976).
7. Id. at § 702.
8. Id. at § 791.
9. Id. at § 760-64.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id at § 706(6). A considerably broader definition of "handicapped individual"
was adopted in 1974 for purposes of Section 503, the focus of this note. "Handicapped
individual" for purposes of Section 503 is defined as any person who: "(A) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person's ma-
jor life activites, (B) has a record of such an impairment, or (C) is regarded as having
such an impairment." See text infra, at notes 36 to 48, for an explanation of the
significance of this definition.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 701(8) (1976).
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discrimination. Briefly stated, Section 501 bans discrimination
against qualified handicapped individuals employed by or seeking
employment with federal agencies." Section 504 prohibits discrim-
ination on the basis of handicap in programs receiving federal finan-
cial assistance.15
Of all the programs established by Congress, Section 503," the
focus of this note, potentially has the most dramatic impact on hand-
icap employment discrimination in the private sector. It mandates
that employers holding contracts with the United States or a federal
agency must promise to take affirmative action to employ and ad-
vance in employment qualified handicapped individuals in carrying
out every government contract of over $2,500." Enforcement of this
provision is delegated to the Department of Labor. 8 Any handicapped
person who believes that a federal contractor has failed or refused
to abide by the terms of the Act may file a complaint with the Secre-
tary of Labor. The Department of Labor must promptly investigate
every complaint and "take such action thereon as the facts and cir-
cumstances warrant .... '"' As this note will demonstrate, for
14. Id. at § 791. In addition, this section establishes an elaborate affirmative
action program to utilize handicapped individuals wherever possible in government
services. Whereas Sections 503 and 504 limit their application to qualified handicapped
individuals, no requirement of qualification is specified in Section 501.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), reads:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States
... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participa-
tion in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
16. Id. at § 793.
17. The term affirmative action is difficult to define. In the Section 503 con-
text, there is no requirement of quotas or specific timetables and goals. The Depart-
ment of Labor has defined affirmative action as: "a set of specific and result-oriented
procedures to which a contractor commits himself to apply every good-faith effort. The
objective of these procedures is equal employment opportunity." 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10
(1977). The implementation regulations for Section 503 suggest that an affirmative ac-
tion program must include the following: dispensing information to handicapped in-
dividuals informing them of their rights under the Act; making special efforts in
employment recruitment and promotions to reach handicapped individuals; inviting
handicapped individuals who are already employed by the contractor to come forward
with suggestions on how their needs can best be accommodated; making every reason-
able effort to accommodate the physical and mental limitations of handicapped
employees; and reviewing all physical and mental job qualifications and making such
changes as are necessary to avoid screening out qualified handicapped individuals. 41
C.F.R. § 60-741.6 (1977). Although the precise obligations of affirmative action are dif-
ficult to determine, one thing is clear: "The obligation to take affirmative action im-
ports more than the negative obligation not to discriminate." Southern Ill. Builders
Ass'n v. Ogelvie, 471 F.2d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1972).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1976).
19. Id.
19791
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numerous reasons, including agency inefficiency and lack of a trained
staff, Department of Labor enforcement has thus far failed to secure
the rights guaranteed to handicapped persons by Section 503.20
Following a brief outline of Section 503's provisions, this note
examines supplemental and alternative theories of relief from
employment discrimination available to beneficiaries of the Act.
Mandamus actions against the Department of Labor"' and review of
administrative action under the Administrative Procedure Act' are
considered first. Although these remedies are limited in scope, plain-
tiffs seeking to force the Department of Labor to take action against
a non-compliant contractor may find them to be valuable. After
discussing these judicial remedies for administrative action, the
basis for direct civil actions by a qualified handicapped individual
against a non-compliant contractor will be explored. In this regard,
this note analyzes Section 503 in light of the test suggested by the
United States Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash' for determining
whether a court should imply a private right of action from a
statute not explicitly authorizing one. Although a number of lower
courts have denied an implied right of action under Section 503,"
the reasoning of the courts in denying relief will be critically examined.
Additionally, this note considers whether qualified handicapped
individuals can sue as third party beneficiaries of the contract
between the government and the contractor. Courts have not ad-
dressed this issue to date,' but this note explains how third party
beneficiary contract analysis also yields a favorable result for per-
sons protected by the Act. Finally, the problems of exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies and primary jurisdiction involved in actions
against federal contractors are discussed. These analyses provide
handicapped individuals alternatives to total reliance on the Depart-
20. See text infra, at notes 66 to 77.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976), provides for United States District Court jurisdic-
tion in mandamus cases brought against government employees and officers. See text
infra, at notes 78 to 91.
22. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1976).
23. 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (action brought by stockholder of corporation to recover
damages from the board of directors who used corporate funds in violation of the
Federal Election Campaign Act, 28 U.S.C. § 610 (1970 and Supp. III 1973) (relief
denied).
24. Woods v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 440 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Del. 1977); Moon
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,
433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977). Contra, Duran v. City of Tampa, 451 F. Supp. 954
(M.D. Fla. 1978); Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
25. But see Guertin v. William Marsh Rice Univ., No. 76-H-880 (S.D. Tex., filed
Jan. 27, 1978), in which the plaintiff is proceeding on a third party beneficiary theory.
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ment of Labor for enforcement of their rights under Section 503.
Before developing these strategies more fully, however, a number of
threshhold issues and definitions must be examined.
THRESHHOLD ISSUES: THE SECTION 503 PLAN
General Provisions
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act imposes obligations on an
estimated 270,000 contractors employing approximately one-third of
the United States work force.2 By its terms, federal contracts
costing more than $2,500 are to include a provision binding the con-
tractor to a policy not to discriminate against job qualified
employees or applicants for employment on the basis of handicap."
Additionally, the contractor promises to take affirmative action to
employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped in-
dividuals at all levels of employment, including executive levels.28
Modification, extensions and renewals of government contracts, as
well as all sub-contracts entered into in carrying out the main con-
tract, are also governed by Section 503."
26. Lublin, Lowering Barriers for the Handicapped, Wall St. J., January 27,
1976, at 1, col. 1.
27. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976). The precise contractual language required is found
at 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.4 (1977):
(a) The contractor will not discriminate against any employee or ap-
plicant for employment because of physical or mental handicap in regard
to any position for which the employee or applicant for employment is
qualified. The contractor agrees to take affirmative action to employ, ad-
vance in employment and otherwise treat qualified handicapped in-
dividuals without discrimination based upon their physical or mental hand-
icap in all employment practices such as the following: employment,
upgrading, demotion or transfer, recruitment, advertising, layoff or ter-
mination, rates of pay or other forms of compensation, and selection for
training, including apprenticeship.
28. Id. Affirmative action guidelines are set forth generally at id. § 60-741.6.
29. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976). Should a contracting agency or contractor fail to in-
clude the prescribed language in a contract or sub-contract as required by the Act, the
implementation regulations provide for incorporation of the clause by operation of law.
41 C.F.R. § 60-741.23 (1977).
The regulations also require every government contractor or sub-contractor
holding a government contract for $50,000 or more and having 50 or more employees
to prepare and maintain a written affirmative action plan. The plan must set forth the
contractor's policies, practices, and procedures with respect to his obligations under
the Act. The contractor must make this plan available for employee inspection at each
of the contractor's facilities during designated hours. See 41 C.F.R. §§
60-741.5 - 60-741.6.
1979]
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The Act and regulations provide some exemptions from the
non-discrimination clause. All contracts and sub-contracts involving
less than $2,500 are exempt.' Additionally, if the President deter-
mines that special circumstances in the national interest warrant an
exemption, he may waive the requirements of Section 503 for any
particular contract. If he does so, however, he must set forth his
reasons in writing in accordance with administrative guidelines.," All
other government contracts are required to include the prescribed
non-discrimination clause.'
Although the Act states that it applies only to employment in-
volved in carrying out government contracts, the Department of
Labor's implementation regulations presume that all employees of a
government contractor are engaged in carrying out the contract."
Although the non-discrimination clause applies to all of a govern-
ment contractor's employees and applicants for employment, a con-
tractor's facilities which are in all respects separate and distinct
from those related to the performance of the contract are exempt
from the requirements of Section 503." Even then, the Director of
30. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (1976). The $2,500 lower limit of Section 503 contrasts
with the lower limit of $10,000 under the analogous provisions of the Vietnam Era
Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. 2012 (1976) (requires federal
contractors and sub-contractors to take affirmative action to employ and advance in
employment Vietnam era veterans), and Executive Order 11246, 3 C.F.R. § 169 (1974)
(requires, inter alia, federal contractors and sub-contractors to develop employment
practices which do not tend to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 793(c) (1976).
32. Although not mentioned in the Act, the implementation regulations waive
the requirements of Section 503 in three additional circumstances: for contracts and
subcontractors with regard to work performed outside the United States by employees
not recruited within the United States; contracts with a state or local government
which does not participate in work on or under the contract or sub-contract; and for
contracts or sub-contracts considered essential to the national security and awarding of
such contracts without compliance with Section 503 is deemed essential to the national
security. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.3 (1977).
33. Id at § 60-741.3(5).
34. The regulations provide that:
The Director may waive the requirements of the affirmative action clause
with respect to any of a prime contractor's or subcontractor's facilities
which he or she finds to be in all respects separate and distinct from ac-
tivities of the prime contractor or subcontractor related to the perform-
ance of the contract or subcontract, provided that he or she also finds
that such a waiver will not interfere with or impede the effectuation of
the Act. Such waivers shall be considered only upon the request of the
contractor or subcontractor.
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the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs is given discre-
tion to determine whether waiver would undermine the goals of the
Act.' Clearly, the regulations take a comprehensive stance on Sec-
tion 503 coverage by including a broader range and greater number
of employment positions than is facially apparent from the statute
itself.
Qualified Handicapped Individuals
In addition to the expansive interpretation of which employees
are engaged in carrying out a government contract, Section 503
adopts a broad definition of who is handicapped. For purposes of
Section 503, a handicapped individual is "any person who (i) has a
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or
more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such
an impairment or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.""'
Focusing on employability, the Department of Labor concluded that
a person is "substantially limited" in a major life activity if he is
likely to experience difficulty in securing, retaining, or advancing in
employment because of a physical or mental condition." "Major life
35. Idt
36. 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1976). The original definition of handicapped person
was changed in 1974. A handicapped person was formerly defined as one who "(A) has
a physical or mental disability which for such individual constitutes or results in a
substantial handicap to employment, and (B) can reasonably be expected to benefit in
terms of employability from vocational rehabilitation services .... " Id. This definition
was retained for purposes of determining eligibility for rehabilitation services.
The definition cited in the text was added in 1974 for purposes of Sections 501,
503, and 504 of the Act. Congress felt that the former definition made little sense
when applied to discrimination in employment because of its focus on disability. The
non-discrimination sections of the Act, particularly Sections 503 and 504, require a per-
son to be qualified for an employment position. Moreover, in parts (B) and (C) of the
new definition Congress recognized that persons who are perceived as having an im-
pairment, persons who were at one time erroneously thought to have an impairment,
or who have recovered from an impairment, are also the victims of discrimination. The
new definition substantially broadens the protected class of persons and shifts the
focus from disability to capability of handicapped persons. See S. REP. No. 1297, supra
note 1, at 29. See notes 42 to 52 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
term "qualified."
In 1978, Congress again amended the definition of handicapped individual for
purposes of Title V of the Act. The purpose of this amendment was to clarify that
alcoholics and drug abusers whose current use of alcohol or drugs prevents them from
performing the job duties assigned or because of alcohol or drug abuse would con-
stitute a direct threat to others' property or safety are not included under the defini-
tion of handicapped individual. 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(6) (Supp. 1979).
37. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.2 (1977). To the extent that intelligence is not job
related, low level intelligence is also covered.
1979]
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activities" include communication, ambulation, self-care, socializa-
tion, education, and transportation." This focus on employability en-
compasses a great many more persons than a definition which
focuses only on actual disability.
Severe handicapping conditions" such as paralysis, blindness
and epilepsy are clearly covered by these definitions, but much
more subtle handicaps are also included. For example, relatively
minor incapacities such as disfigurement or stuttering fall under the
Act's coverage because of their potential impact on employability.
Congress, however, went beyond actual disability in its protection
against unreasonable discrimination on the basis of handicap.
Congress recognized that discrimination on the basis of hand-
icap is as much a result of employers' perceptions of disability as it
is of actual disability. In order to combat discrimination based on er-
roneous perceptions, the Act prohibits employment discrimination
against persons "regarded as being handicapped."" Identical con-
siderations led Congress to include persons with a record of disability
in their definition of handicapped person. This added definition pro-
tects persons who have recovered from disabilities, and those per-
sons with erroneous records of disability.4 For example, persons
38. Id at § 60-741 App. A.
39. The Rehabilitation Act defines the term "severe handicap" as a "disability
which requires multiple services over an extended period of time" and results from a
number of specified conditions. 29 U.S.C. § 706(12) (1976).
40. 29 U.S.C. § 706(6)(c) (1976). See S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 1, at 27. The
impact of perceptions of disability by others manifests itself in the phenomenon known
as the "self-fulfilling prophecy." Behavioral scientists who have studied this phe-
nomenon have recognized that persons seen by others as being incapable of performing
certain functions tend to develop in a manner consistent with other's expectations. See
generally Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra note 1, at 858. Moreover, discrimination based
on perceived disability will tend to complicate social adjustment. A particularly severe
example of this was noted in cases in which heroin addicts participated in methadone
maintenance programs. Denial of employment to these persons on the basis of par-
ticipation created problems in these persons' lives similar to those which led to addic-
tion in the first place. See Note, Methadone Maintenance Programs and Participation
as a Hiring Criterion, 5 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 421, 422 (1973).
41. One reason advanced by employers for discrimination against persons who
have recovered from a disability or who are partially disabled is the fear that a job-
related second injury may cause a person to become totally disabled. The enhanced
danger of complete disability, employers fear, will increase their workman's compensa-
tion premiums. This liability can be mitigated somewhat through the use of "second-
injury funds" by employers. It is also offset by the above-average safety record of hand-
icapped employees. See Note, 8 LoY. CHL L. REV., supra note 2, at 820-25. See general-
ly Baker & Karol, Employee Insurance Benefit Plans and Discrimination on the Basis
of Handicap, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 1013 (1978).
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who have recovered from epilepsy or cancer and persons who at an
early age were misdiagnosed as having a disability and whose
records still reflect the misdiagnosis are covered. The Act thus en-
compasses a broad spectrum of handicapping conditions.
Although Section 503 prohibits discrimination by government
contractors on the basis of all degrees of handicap, mere proof of
handicap is not enough to secure protection of the Act in a given
situation. Only those persons who are otherwise qualified for an
employment position are protected. The regulations define a
qualified handicapped individual as one who is "capable of perform-
ing a particular job with reasonable accommodation to his or her
handicap." 2 Through the addition of this criterion, employers are
protected from excessively burdensome responsibilities.
Employers, however, still must determine what constitutes
reasonable accommodation to a particular handicap. Clearly, when
dealing with a person merely perceived as disabled or with an er-
roneous record of disability, the employer has no particular problems
because the individual's ability is not affected. The employer must
simply put aside his bias when dealing with the individual in
employment relations. Questions do arise as to the meaning of reason-
able accommodations, however, when the employer deals with per-
sons who are substantially limited in major life activities due to
disability. The regulations indicate that employees' physical and
mental limitations must be accommodated unless accommodation im-
poses an "undue hardship" on the contractor's business.'8 Business
necessity and financial costs are specifically mentioned as ap-
propriate considerations in determining the degree of a contractor's
obligations." However, the regulations offer no guidance on whether
"reasonable accommodation" demands employer acceptance of lower
job performance expectations or merely requires job facility accom-
modation.'5 The type of accommodation required is thus an impor-
tant question for employers and persons covered by the Act.
Although the situation is far from clear, several factors in-
dicate that employers need make no accommodation for lower job
42. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.1 (1977).
43. Id. at § 60-741.6(d).
44. Id.
45. One commentator has suggested that there is no difference between job
performance accommodation and physical accommodation. Both result in lowered out-
put and in either case the employer makes a sacrifice. Note, Affirmative Action
Toward Hiring Qualified Handicapped Individuals, 49 So. CAL. L. REV. 785, 815-17
(1976).
1979]
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performance expectations under the Act. First, both the paternalism
suggested by this type of accommodation and the resentment
generated among fellow workers by lower job performance stand-
ards for selected employees create further barriers to integration of
handicapped persons into society." Congress intended to eradicate
vestiges of charity wherever feasible and to assure hand-
icapped persons a life of dignity, fully integrated into the social
mainstream. 7 Secondly, the Act affects all levels of employment, in-
cluding the executive." Lowering executive level productivity would
not be tolerated by contractors because of business necessity.
However, physical accommodation would be only minimally disrup-
tive to accepted business practices. Finally, interpreting accommoda-
tion in terms of expectations would conflict with the provision of the
Fair Labor Standards Act which permits employers to pay handicap-
ped individuals whose disability affects productive capacity less
than the minimum wage.4' The implementation regulations under
46. See C. BRIDGES, JOB PLACEMENT OF THE PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED 31 (1946)
("The disabled need sympathetic understanding, not sympathy or special handling");
Siller, Attitudes Toward Disability, CONTEMP. VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION 72 (1976)
(Treatment of the handicapped with special or benevolent attitudes constitutes a veiled
discrimination). Contra Wright, Equal Treatment of the Handicapped by Federal Con-
tractors, 26 EMORY L.J. 65, 101-02 (1977) (sympathetic attitudes are not discriminatory).
See Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200, 202 (N.D. Tex. 1977) (special treatment
of handicapped results from sympathy, not intolerance).
Sex discrimination cases are apposite in the present context. In Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel., 408 F.2d 288 (5th Cir. 1969), plaintiff was denied a position
on the basis of a company policy which prohibited women from being considered for a
job which involved occasional handling of a 34 pound fire extinguisher. Rejecting the
company's "romantic paternalism," the court held that women must be considered on
the basis of their actual ability to perform a job. Id. at 290. Accord, LaFleur v.
Cleveland Board of Educ., 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (pregnant teachers denied opportunity to
continue to teach after fifth month of pregnancy); Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444
F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (plaintiff denied job as a telegraph agent because employer
believed position was too strenuous for a woman).
47. The Congress finds that-
(6) it is essential that recommendations be made to assure that all
individuals with handicaps are able to live their lives independently and
with dignity, and that the complete integration of all individuals with handi-
caps into normal community living, working, and service patterns be held
as the final objective.
Pub. L. No. 93-651, § 301, 89 Stat. 2-16 (1974) (White House Conference on Handicapped
Individuals Act).
48. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.6(a) (1977). See discussion of job-relatedness infra at
notes 156 to 165. See also Lang, Protecting the Handicapped from Employment
Discrimination The Job-Relatedness and Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Doc-
trines, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 989 (1978).
49. 29 U.S.C. § 214(D) (1976).
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Section 503 specifically forbid reduction of compensation offered to
any "otherwise qualified" employee because of handicap.5 The ob-
vious converse of this requirement is that an employee not other-
wise qualified for a position may receive lowered compensation
without violating Section 503. All of the above-mentioned factors
tend to indicate that accommodation need only concern physical re-
quirements of handicapped persons and that handicapped persons
must compete on an equal footing with other employees in all other
respects.
In spite of the ambiguities of the definition of "qualified hand-
icapped individual," this Act clearly protects a large number of
persons in the private sector who were previously unprotected. The
problem remains, however, how persons purportedly benefitted by
Section 503 effectuate the rights granted by the Act. The Act itself
grants a specific right in an aggrieved handicapped person to com-
plain to the Department of Labor if he believes that a government
contractor is not in compliance with his obligations under the con-
tract.51 But beyond this procedure, the Act is silent as to remedies.2
Remedies, therefore, comprise the subject matter of the remainder
of this note.
ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 503 BY THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
The Department of Labor's Office of Federal Contract Com-
pliance Programs (hereinafter OFCCP) is burdened with the bulk of
responsibility for enforcement of Section 503 of the Rehabilitation
Act." In addition to enforcement of Section 503, the OFCCP enforces
two analogous programs affecting employment opportunities for
employees of government contractors: Section 402 of the Vietnam
Era Veterans Readjustment Act which requires federal contractors
to take affirmative action to employ and advance in employment
50. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.4 (1977). Specifically, the contract requires that the
employer not discriminate on the basis of handicap in "rates of pay and other forms of
compensation." Id. Other compensation presumably includes insurance benefits which
are frequently of special importance for handicapped employees because of the dif-
ficulties they often have in obtaining insurance.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 793(c) (1976).
52. Compare Sections 501 and 504 of the Act which were amended in 1978 to
give plaintiffs explicit rights to sue for violations of these provisions. 29 U.S.C.A.
791, 794 (Supp. 1979).
53. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.25. The Director of the OFCCP may delegate com-
pliance responsibilities under the Act to a specified officer of the contracting agency.
Ultimate approval of all enforcement actions undertaken by the contracting agency
must still come from the Director. Id. at § 60-741.24.
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qualified veterans of the Vietnam era;" and Executive Order 11246
which mandates equal opportunity for all persons employed by
federal contractors without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin." Enforcement of these programs occurs primarily
through compliance review of affirmative action programs developed
by the contractors.58 The purpose of these compliance reviews is to
determine whether the contractor is guilty of any systematic
discrimination against protected classes of employees.57 Section 503
enforcement is increasingly being geared to directed compliance
reviews.'
Aside from its task of directed compliance reviews, Section 503
requires the OFCCP to process individual complaints from handi-
capped persons alleging contractor non-compliance. Any handicapped
individual who believes that any contractor has failed or refused to
comply with the provisions of his government contract relating to
employment of handicapped persons may file a complaint with the
Department of Labor."' The Department of Labor's authorized en-
forcement agency, the OFCCP, is required to investigate complaints
promptly and to take such action on the complaints as the facts and
circumstances warrant.' If the OFCCP determines that a contract
54. 38 U.S.C. § 2012 (1976).
55. 3 C.F.R. § 169 (1977).
56. See OFFICE OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS, DIRECTED COM-
PLIANCE REVIEW PROCEDURES FOR VETERANS AND HANDICAPPED WORKER'S AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION PROGRAMS UNDER SECTION 402 OF THE VIETNAM ERA VETERANS READJUSTMENT
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1974 AND SECTION 503 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973, AS
AMENDED, (Draft, January 3, 1978); UNITED STATES DEPT. OF LABOR, OFFICE OF FEDERAL
CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS TASK FORCE,' PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE
REVITALIZATION OF FEDERAL CONTRACT COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 9 (1977). [hereinafter
cited as COMPLIANCE REVIEW PROCEDURES].
57. COMPLIANCE REVIEW PROCEDURES, supra note 56. In Reynolds Metals Co.
v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1977), the court noted the function of the OFCCP:
The Compliance Office monitors government contractors to determine
whether they are meeting their commitments as equal opportunity
employers. It gives priority to the eradication of systematic discrimina-
tion rather than to the investigation and resolution of complaints about
isolated instances of discrimination. The duty of the Compliance Office
and Compliance agencies to receive and promptly process complaints
must be considered in this context. The complaints which they process
are those dealing with systematic violations of a company's contractual
obligation to comply with the requirements of the contract programs,
rather than those dealing with the violation of rights afforded an in-
dividual employee.
58. COMPLIANCE REVIEW PROCEDURES, supra note 56,
59. 29 U.S.C. § 793(b) (1976).
60. i&; 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.26 (1977); cf. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 546
F.2d 663 (4th Cir. 1977).
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violation exists, the implementation regulations require the agency
to proceed first with "persuasive and conciliatory" efforts of enforc-
ing compliance. 1 The offending contractor must commit itself to an
approved corrective action program in order to be considered in
compliance. 2
Should the OFCCP's efforts at reaching a conciliatory agree-
ment fail, the regulations- prescribe a number of alternative enforce-
ment procedures. Although judicial action is included," the enforce-
ment regulations emphasize other remedies. With approval of the
Director of OFCCP, contract progress payments may be withheld
until the contractor complies, or the contract may be terminated."
The most severe penalty for non-compliance is debarment of the con-
tractor from eligibility for future government contracts. 5 These
remedies for non-compliance clearly focus on the enormous leverage
the government wields in its power to award and administer pro-
curement contracts.
Although the manipulation of these remedies is potentially an
effective enforcement tool, the OFCCP has a dismal record of suc-
cess in effectuating the rights guaranteed by Section 503. Fewer
than half of the complaints received by the OFCCP in a year are
resolved." A recent Department of Labor task force report severely
criticized the OFCCP for lacking the will and commitment to enforce
Section 503. The report suggested that alternative means of enforc-
ing the Act be adopted. 7 Moreover, the Section 503 implementation
regulations adopted by the Department of Labor are regarded by
61. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.26 (1977). If the contractor has an applicable internal
review procedure, the regulations require exhaustion of this procedure first. If the
complaint has not been resolved internally within 60 days, it will be processed by the
OFCCP. I&
62. Id. In the event compliance responsibilities are delegated to a contracting
agency, the Director must approve of a contractor's commitment to corrective action
before the contractor is considered in compliance. Id.
63. I& at § 60-741.28(b).
64. Id. at § 60-741.28(c)(d).
65. Id at § 60-741.28(e). The Director of the OFCCP is required to periodically
distribute a list of contractors and sub-contractors debarred from future contracts. Id.
at § 60-741.31. To date, no contractors have been debarred.
66. In fiscal year 1975, the OFCCP received 331 complaints, 97 having been
resolved. 63 U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR ANN. REP., FISCAL YEAR 1975 33 (1976). During fiscal
year 1976, over 1,500 complaints were received and less than 800 were closed. Under
Section 402 of the Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act, only 33 of 108
were closed. 64 U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR ANN. REP., FISCAL YEAR 1976 30 (1977). In fiscal
year 1977, 82 workers received back pay awards. During the same period, over 2,000
complaints were filed. 65 U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR ANN. REP., FISCAL YEAR 1977 58 (1978).
67. COMPLIANCE REVIEWS PROCEDURES, supra note 56, at 28.
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the Congressional Oversight Committee as inadequate to enforce
Section 503, particularly because of their emphasis on conciliation."
At the same time that the OFCCP was criticized for lack of effective
enforcement of Section 503 through the review procedure, the agency
changed its focus on achieving compliance from individual complaint
review to contractor implementation procedure review." The pur-
68. Oversight Hearings on Rehabilitation of the Handicapped Programs and
the Implementation of the Same by Agencies Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 321-22, 1502-03 (1976) (remarks of Congressman Dodd and
Senator Williams). Senator Williams said at the hearings:
It has been almost 3 long years since these provisions became the
law of the land. [Reference to Title V of Rehabilitation Act of 1973.] And
we are deeply concerned.
We are concerned that there has been little progress in hiring and
promoting disabled persons by Federal contractors and by the Federal
Government itself; that regulations have yet to be issued to implement
the law prohibiting discrimination by Federal grantees, and that the
rights of millions of handicapped individuals have been allowed to suf-
focate as a result of inadequate public educational programs about these
rights and remedies and because of inadequate enforcement of these
rights.
We have heard from many of the groups representing the handicapped
that these programs have so far been a failure. They are frustrated and
angry-and I don't blame them.
We know that the agencies have done little in the way of actual en-
forcement-that the cases processed by all the agencies under these laws
total less than 1,000 in the 3-year history of this statute.
We know that the agencies have not hired the personnel which the
Congress has mandated as necessary for enforcement of these laws.
The purpose of these Hearings is so that disabled individuals do
not have to wait another 3 years for an implementation and, or another
100 years for the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness to
become a reality.
Id at 1502-03 (emphasis added).
Congressman Dodd noted the failure of enforcement mechanisms as
well:
Even with the provision already enacted by Congress in the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, specifically Section 501, 503, and 504 [29 U.S.C.
§§ 791, 793 and 794], there has been little elimination of discrimination
against the handicapped. This is a result of ... a lack of enforcement by
the Federal Government of these sections ....
At my request the General Accounting Office undertook a study of
Section 503 and 504 of The Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Their report issued
last August disclosed that 3 years after enactment there has been
minimal enforcement of Section 503 and none devised by the executive
branch to implement 504.
Id. at 321-22.
69. COMPLIANCE REVIEW PROCEDURES, supra note 56, at 33.
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pose of implementation reviews is to determine whether a contrac-
tor is meeting its commitments under the Act and to eradicate any
vestiges of systematic discrimination. The reviews are not intended
to deal with violation of individual rights. All of these factors sug-
gest that the prospective benefits to individual handicapped persons
under Section 503 are in serious danger of being diluted unless the
beneficiaries of the Act are given powers to ensure enforcement.
Recognizing administrative inability to effectively enforce
federal laws, Congress and the courts have frequently vested
private parties with the right to seek judicial remedies for violation
of statutory duties." Congress provided explicit private rights of ac-
tion under several statutes, including sections of the Rehabilitation
Act. 2 When a statute lacks an explicit private remedy, the federal
courts have frequently implied a private right of action in addition
to the remedies provided by the statute. 8 These statutory and court
created remedies include both actions against the enforcement agency
and actions against the offending party.
Under Section 503 a handicapped person harmed by a federal
contractor's discrimination on the basis of handicap has a number of
alternative remedies. He may file a complaint with the Department
70. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663, 668 (4th Cir. 1977).
71. See, e.g., Allen v. Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 144 (1970) (failure of At-
torney General to enforce Voting Rights Act); J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964)
(failure of Securities and Exchange Commission to enforce Securities and Exchange
Act); Adams v. Weinberger, 391 F. Supp. 269 (D.D.C. 1975) (Civil Rights Act); Com-
ment, 17 SANTA CLARA LAW. 405, 408-13 (1977); S. REP. No. 147, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973) (Age Discrimination in Employment Act). In a recent four year period, HEW's
Office for Civil Rights resolved only one-fifth of the 871 discrimination complaints it
received and "did almost nothing" to enforce the law. Washington Post, Nov. 8, 1977,
at 1, col. 3. See generally Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An In.
adequate Surrogate for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974).
72. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1976) (citizens suits authorized to enforce
the Clean Air Act); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (suits authorized for violations of civil
rights).
73. See Note, Implying Civil Remedies From Federal Regulatory Statutes,
77 HARV. L. REV. 285 (1963). Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), is the
leading case on the theory of implied remedies. In it the Court implied a private right
of action in favor of an employee of a railroad injured because of a violation of the
Federal Safety Appliance Act. A number of cases have followed the lead of Rigsby.
See, e.g., J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (Securities and Exchange Act);
Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Engineers, 323 U.S. 210 (1944)
(Railway Labor Act); Burke v. Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, 433 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir.
1971). But see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975) (Fair Election Campaign Act); National
Ry. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of Ry. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (Amtrack
Ac).
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of Labor as Section 503 provides7' and await agency determination
of his claim. This procedure has the advantage of relative low cost,
but as previously suggested, the complainant is quite likely to be
dissatisfied with the outcome. In addition to this remedy, the com-
plainant may bring an action against the OFCCP, reviewing the agency
action or inaction, in order to force the agency to perform its legal
duties. 5 Although of value in certain circumstances, actions against
an agency have serious limitations." The major limitation is that
courts will only intervene in agency determinations where there is
demonstrable abuse of discretion. Consequently a wronged hand-
icapped individual may find a direct lawsuit against a non-compliant
contractor in which the injured party seeks damages or specific
relief, or both, a preferable means of enforcing his rights. The direct
lawsuit against a non-compliant contractor is costly and frequently
involves lengthy delays, but it may be the only effective enforce-
ment tool available in most situations. This conclusion has been
borne out in situations under similar laws.7 Each of the available
remedies has its own limitations and pitfalls which must be ex-
plored.
COMPELLING AN ENFORCEMENT AGENCY TO ACT: MANDAMUS
A mandamus action against the Director of the OFCCP is one
alternative remedy available to a handicapped person dissatisfied
with agency enforcement of his claim against a non-compliant con-
tractor. According to the federal mandamus statute, an action for
74. See text supro, at notes 66 to 70.
75. These actions are authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976) (Mandamus) and 5
U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1976).
76. See Albert, supra note 71, at 426-29.
77. It now appears that effective enforcement of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (1976), is entirely dependent upon private law
suits by aggrieved individuals. In a Senate Special Committee on Aging report, the
committee noted:
[E]mployer refusals to hire older workers jumped from 683 in fiscal
1971 to 818 in fiscal 1972. Failure to promote mature workers was involved
in 339 instances, nearly 28% greater than the previous year. And, these
figures represent only a fraction of the violations under the law, since
many illegal practices go unreported .... Despite the clear cut need for
vigorous enforcement, only 136 court actions, or about 36 per year, had
been filed by the Department of Labor through fiscal 1972 .... [O]nly
limited time is devoted to age discrimination activities, although the prob-
lem is still severe and and may be intensifying.
S. REP. No. 147, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1973). See also Comment, 17 SANTA CLARA
LAw. 405 (1977).
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mandamus may be brought in a federal district court against an of-
ficer or employee of the federal government or a federal agency to
compel the performance of a legal duty which the officer or
employee owes to the plaintiff. 8 Unless he has delegated his power
to enforce Section 503 to the contracting agency, the Director of the
OFCCP will be the defendant owing a duty of enforcement of the
Act to a handicapped person."
In order to maintain his action in mandamus against the Direc-
tor of the OFCCP or other enforcement official, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the duty owed to him is mandatory and not mere-
ly discretionary.8' By the terms of Section 503, the Director owes
duties to handicapped individuals protected by the act. Those duties
are two-fold: to receive and promptly investigate complaints alleging
non-compliance and to take such action as the complaint and its cir-
cumstances warrant.81
The duty to receive and investigate complaints is fairly self-
evident. An aggrieved handicapped person is given an explicit right
in the statute to complain to the Department of Labor.8 The Depart-
ment must "promptly investigate" each complaint.' The plaintiff
who believes that the OFCCP or its designated enforcement agency
omitted or unreasonably delayed investigation of his complaint may
bring an action to compel the agency to act on his claim.8 ' Although
the plaintiff may compel the agency to respond to his complaint
through a mandamus action, the mandamus cases indicate that in
the absence of specific mandatory guidelines, investigation may be
conducted in the manner in which the agency deems appropriate.8 5
78. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the
nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any
agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff." 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
79. When the Director has delegated any of his authority to enforce the Act
pursuant to 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.24(b) (1977), the person who obtains that authority may
be a proper co-defendant.
80. Mandamus will not lie unless the duty allegedly owed imposes a man-
datory or ministerial obligation. If the alleged duty is discretionary, the duty is not
owed. E.g., Short v. Murphy, 512 F.2d 374 (6th Cir. 1975).
81. "The agency shall promptly investigate such complaint and shall take such
action thereon as the facts and circumstances warrant, consistent with the terms of
such contract and the laws and regulations applicable thereto." 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976).
82. Id
83. 1I
84. See National Resources Defense Counsel, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829,
834-41 (D.D.C.), affd, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
85. See Udall v. Taunak, 398 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1968); Lewis v. Western
1979]
Schoon: Private Rights of Action for Handicapped Persons under Section 50
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1979
470 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 13
The courts will not oversee the manner in which an agency performs
its duties absent evidence of arbitrary or unreasonable conduct."
Aside from being able to compel an agency to respond to his com-
plaint by investigation, the complainant may request the court to
issue an order compelling the OFCCP to take appropriate action on
his complaint."
In the event a violation of the Section 503 non-discrimination
clause is discovered, the implementation regulations require the en-
forcement agency to pursue one of a number of enforcement pro-
cedures. 8 Among these are withholding of progress payments,
cancellation of the contract, debarment of the contractor, and civil
litigation. 9 The choice of enforcement procedures appears to be a
matter of discretion within the agency, but at the very least the
plaintiff may be able to compel the agency to exercise its discre-
tionary powers." Again, the court will not make the choice for the
agency and thereby displace the agency's role. But the exercise of
this choice and subsequent agency action is subject to judicial
review."
The degree of discretion which the enforcement agency is per-
mitted to exercise in the investigation of complaints and pursuit of
enforcement indicates that mandamus may be useful to a complain-
ant in very few instances. The apparent lack of effective enforce-
ment of Section 503 by the OFCCP, however, is an indication that
this remedy will increase in importance as a tool for handicapped
persons. Obviously, the more ineffectual the OFCCP appears in the
eyes of the courts, the more likely that mandamus and other forms
of relief against an administrative agency will be employed.
Airlines, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 684 (M.D. Cal. 1974); Clore Restaurant, Inc. v. Payne, 72 F.
Supp. 677 (D.D.C. 1947).
86. State Highway Comm'n v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099 (10th Cir. 1973). See Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701, 706 (1976); Text, infr, at notes 92 to 97.
But see National Resources Defense Counsel v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 841 (D.D.C.),
affd, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1974), wherein the court retained jurisdiction of the case
until the agency complied with the judgment rendered.
87. 29 U.S.C. 793(c) (1976).
88. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.28 (1977); text, supra, at notes 53-55.
89. Id.
90. United States ex reL Chicago Great Western Ry. Co., v. ICC, 294 U.S. 50,
61 (1935); National Resources Defense Counsel, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 834
(D.D.C.), affd, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir. 1974); North American Van Lines, Inc. v. ICC,
386 F. Supp. 665, 683 (N.D. Ind. 1974).
91. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. at 842;
Lewis v. Western Airlines, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 684, 686 (M.D. Cal. 1974).
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REVIEW OF COMPLIANCE AGENCY ACTION UNDER THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
92
A second theory of relief to which a complainant under Section
503 may be entitled in an action against the OFCCP is judicial
review of the agency's performance under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (hereinafter APA)." The APA provides that a person
adversely affected or suffering a legal wrong because of agency ac-
tion is entitled to judicial review of that action." The plaintiff in
such an action, in some respects, is in the same position as a plaintiff
in an ordinary lawsuit. A rule created for his benefit has been
disregarded causing him damage. The only relief available to him is
in court.
The most significant difference between an action seeking
judicial review of an enforcement agency's action and a lawsuit
against a private party is in the variety of factors applied by the
court in granting relief. In a typical lawsuit against a private party,
the court makes determinations of fact and law de novo and then
renders a judgment which, when enforced, compels specific action.
When a court reviews an agency's conduct, it looks only to the fac-
tors which the agency applied in reaching its decision to act." If the
agency applied the correct factors in reaching its decision, and ap-
plied the factors reasonably and in accordance with the law, then
the agency's decision stands. If the court finds one of an enumerated
list of abuses relating to administrative due process in the agency's
decision-making process, then the agency's decision is set aside."
The court will not compel specific agency action in most instances.
Instead, the agency must make a redetermination of the issues in-
volved in the case in light of the court's decision and interpreta-
tions. 7
To date there have been no cases seeking judicial review of
OFCCP enforcement decisions, although there are potentially situa-
92. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1976). There is necessarily some overlap of this topic
with the mandamus section of the note. Mandamus is an appropriate remedy under the
APA, although the type and scope of relief available under the APA is more diverse.
93. Id
94. "A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely af-
fected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute is entitled
to judicial review thereof." Il at § 706.
95. Id.
96. Al. at § 706(2).
97. The issues involved in judicial review of agency action are extremely com-
plex and a full treatment of these issues is beyond the scope of the present note. See
generally K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 23.01-28.21 (1958, Supp. 1971,
Supp. 1976, & Supp. 1978).
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tions in which the remedy would be appropriate. Those situations
would be primarily cases in which the plaintiff filed a complaint with
the OFCCP and the agency either failed to find a violation or found
a violation but took enforcement action deemed by the complainant
to be inappropriate. The latter situation would, in most instances, in-
volve a failure on the part of the OFCCP to recover back wages, lost
seniority, or both, while imposing some other sanction. In either
case the plaintiff alleges an injury due to agency action which, if
unredressed, would not only harm himself, but also undermine the
congressional purpose of eliminating employment discrimination on
the basis of handicap among government contractors.
A key preliminary issue in such a lawsuit against the Director
of the OFCCP is whether the agency's action is committed to agency
discretion by law, within the meaning of Section 701 of the APA,
and therefore not subject to review." Contractors, the most likely
opponents to judicial review of compliance agency action, are apt to
argue that the implementation regulations allow complete agency
discretion in enforcement proceedings. These opponents will point to
the informality the regulations endorse in settling complaints."
They may also stress that where informality fails, the remedies
specified in the regulations are all phrased in the alternative.'" The
regulations appear to commit the OFCCP's choice to the Director's
discretion. Thus, determinations and agency prescribed remedies
are arguably not subject to review.
As additional support for the argument against review, contrac-
tors might contend that the agency is acting within its special
sphere of expertise.'' Its decisions are based on complex factors and
special knowledge beyond the competency of the court. Because the
compliance agency is in a better position to know the needs of the
contractor and the abilities of a particular handicapped person, the
court should not interfere with the OFCCP's decisions.'02
This analysis of Section 503 has several weaknesses. Initially, it
fails to make an adequate distinction between matters which merely
involve agency discretion and those which are committed to agency
98. The APA creates a presumption in favor of judicial review except to the
extent that it is made expressly not reviewable by terms of the statute or "committed
to agency discretion by law." 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1976). See Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967).
99. 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.26 (1977).
100. I& at § 60-741.28 (1977). See text supra, at notes 59 to 62.
101. See Wright, supra note 46, at 91-92.
102. I
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discretion by law. 10 The former are reviewable while the latter are
not.10 ' Clearly, the choice of the manner in which investigation of a
complaint will be conducted and the enforcement procedures utilized
by the OFCCP involve agency discretion. But such action is
arguably not committed to agency discretion by law because the Act
requires the agency to investigate every complaint it receives. The
Act also requires the OFCCP to take action warranted by the facts
and circumstances, consistent with the terms of the contract, ap-
plicable law, and regulations. The terms of the Act indicate that
agency action is reviewable because the agency must apply law in
its decisions of what is appropriate action. Obviously interpretation
of statutory and contractual terms is within the court's area of
special competence.105 Moreover, the courts have a vast amount of
experience from sex and race discrimination cases to draw upon in
examining factual determinations of discrimination and reasonable
accommodation.' °6 Although handicapping conditions and the limita-
tions handicaps impose are much less familiar to the courts, tradi-
tional concepts of discrimination can be applied in reviewing the
factors on which an agency bases its decisions."
103. See, e.g., Kletschka v. Driver, 411 F. 2d 436 (2d Cir. 1969). In Kletschka,
the court had before it the issue of whether the Veterans Administration had con-
spired against a doctor in refusing to grant him a research grant for development of an
artificial heart. The court refused to review the decision because of the expertise re-
quired in making determinations of whether to award a research grant. The court
found the agency's knowledge was so superior to that of the court, that it would not be
practical to review such a decision.
Professor Davis is critical of this decision because of the court's focus on the
technical sidelights of the case rather than the legal issues involved:
Finding facts about an alleged conspiracy is in the heart of judicial com-
petence, even if the subject matter is highly specialized; so would be an
inquiry into motivation of the officials, the propriety of what they chose
to consider, the plausibility of their findings, and a determination of
whether the findings supported the decision. Much of what the plaintiff
wanted reviewed may thus have been within judicial competence.
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 517 (3d ed. 1971).
104. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.05 (1958 & Supp. 1970).
105. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 517 (3d ed. 1971).
106. See, e.g., Nance v. Union Carbide, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 436, 454 (W.D.N.C.
1975), and authorities cited therein on judicial expertise in determining sex discrimina-
tion in employment.
107. See, e.g., LaFluer v. Cleveland Bd. of Education, 414 U.S. 646 (1975) (preg-
nant school teachers not permitted to teach beyond fifth month of pregnancy held
unlawfully discriminatory); Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1976) (school
system refusal to consider blind applicants for teaching position held unlawfully
discriminatory).
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A case involving the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act is instructive on how a court can apply familiar con-
cepts in an area given over to agency enforcement.0 The Act gives
the Secretary of Labor exclusive power to initiate proceedings
against a union to set aside an election in which there have been
unlawful irregularities.1  In DeVito v. Schultz, °10 the plaintiff
brought an action seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the
Secretary of Labor to initiate proceedings to set aside the results of
an election. The court found that the plaintiff had a judicially en-
forceable right to demand that the Secretary exercise his discre-
tionary authority in a manner consistent with the requirements of
the Act. Although the court would not replace its decision for that
of the Secretary, it ordered the Secretary to reopen the investigation
of the election. If after re-investigation the Secretary still would not
initiate proceedings, then a full written explanation had to be pro-
vided. In ruling that the factors which the agency considered in
making its determination were reviewable, the court stated that
courts have a duty to maintain minimum standards in the Executive
Department. Only through strict scrutiny of agency action by the
courts would there be assurance that the wishes of Congress would
not be frustrated by the discretionary decisions of an
administrator.'
De Vito is analogous to the situation in which the Director of
the OFCCP has refused to initiate compliance procedures or has in-
itiated compliance actions which fail to give the complainant an ade-
quate remedy. In these instances, a plaintiff can demand that the
OFCCP set forth its reasons for denying the relief sought. De Vito
principles require the courts to closely scrutinize the basis on which
these decisions are made.
The plaintiff who has lost wages or seniority because of a con-
tractor's non-compliance which the OFCCP failed to recover in en-
forcement proceedings is in the best position to make use of a
108. DeVito v. Schultz, 300 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1969) (brought under the
Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 481-83 (1976)). See also
Hodson v. Lodge 851, Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 454 F.2d 545 (7th
Cir. 1971); NAACP v. Levi, 418 F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1976).
109. 29 U.S.C. § 481(e) (1976). See Calhoun v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134 (1964).
110. 300 F. Supp. 381 (D.D.C. 1969).
111. 300 F. Supp. at 383. DeVito also stands for the proposition that where the
administrative remedy is exclusive, judicial scrutiny will be strict in order to insure
that the rights granted by the statutory scheme are not undermined. Id. This stricter
standard may become applicable if direct private remedies against contractors are
precluded by the courts.
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remedy against the agency. Debarment of the contractor or a con-
ciliatory agreement which prescribes prospective relief only is inap-
propriate from the handicapped person's perspective. In order to
ensure that the rights which Congress granted handicapped persons
under Section 503 are enforced, the courts should closely examine
prospective solutions to discrimination. Only the threat of retroac-
tive liability in the form of back wages and seniority will adequately
discourage government contractors from avoiding implementation of
Section 503 requirements.1
Although an action challenging an administrative decision of
the OFCCP has obvious value in certain circumstances, " 8 it also
presents serious limitations. First of all the plaintiff is not entitled
to a de novo court determination of what the contractor is obligated
112. In Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the Court ob-
served:
If employers faced only the prospect of an injunctive order, they would
have little incentive to shun practices of dubious legality. It is the
reasonably certain prospect of a back pay award that 'provides the spur
or catalyst which causes employers . . . to self-examine and self-evaluate
their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possi-
ble, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in this coun-
try's history.' (citation omitted).
Id. at 417-18.
In 1977 only 82 workers recovered back pay through agency enforcement of
Section 503. During the same period, 2,000 complaints were received by the OFCCP.
65 DEPT. OF LABOR ANN. REP. FISCAL YEAR 1977 58 (1978).
113. Two additional circumstances exist in which review of OFCCP perform-
ance may be beneficial. The first of these is the situation in which the OFCCP has
reviewed and approved a contractor's affirmative action program relating to the
employment of handicapped individuals and the plaintiff alleges that the plan does not
conform with the Act. Again, there are no cases to date on point under Section 503..
However, in an analogous situation, the court in Percy v. Brennan, 384 F. Supp. 800
(S.D.N.Y. 1974), held that plaintiffs were entitled to challenge OFCCP approval of an
affirmative action program proposed by New York construction contractors with
obligations under Executive Order 11246. The court would not prescribe the terms of
the affirmative action program, but it would order the OFCCP to reject the proposed
plan and enforce 11246. Section 503 employees are in virtually the same position as the
plaintiffs in Percy and could conceivably force OFCCP withdrawal of approval from,
defective employment programs.
A second instance in which a plaintiff may consider utilizing a suit challenging
administrative action is that in which a contracting agency has entered a contract with
a non-compliant contractor. In Hadnot v. Laird, 463 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court
found that private litigants could seek order to force the Secretary of Defense and the
Administrator of the General Services Administration to abrogate existing contracts
and to restrain further contracting with companies which allegedly failed to comply,
with Executive Order 11246. This case indicates that qualified handicapped individuals
may challenge the validity of government contracts in order to ensure effective en-
forcement of Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act.
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to give him. The court will examine the basis on which an agency
made its determination of these obligations, but it will not
substitute its judgment for that of the agency. As long as a rational
basis for the agency's judgment exists, the decision will stand.
Secondly, the plaintiff is likely to experience lengthy delays before
receiving relief-from a court. He must exhaust his remedies within
the OFCCP".' before he can begin the long wait on the court docket.
Finally, a prospective plaintiff must consider the expense involved
in bringing such a difficult and novel lawsuit."'
Despite these limitations, a qualified handicapped individual
may find an action against the OFCCP will accomplish his goals.
Although a more desirable form of action may be a direct action
against a federal contractor, there is no assurance that a direct ac-
tion will be available under the Act."" In the event that a direct ac-
tion is foreclosed by the courts, the beneficiaries of Section 503 will
inevitably become more dependent on vigorous enforcement by the
OFCCP and judicial review of its decisions. Hopefully the courts will
recognize that the Department of Labor cannot effectively enforce
Section 503 and will permit a private right of action to supplement
agency enforcement. However, direct civil actions against contrac-
tors, possibly on either an implied remedy theory or third party
beneficiary theory, present their own problems.
DIRECT CIVIL ACTION AGAINST A NON-COMPLIANT GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTOR: IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION
An action brought directly against a non-compliant federal con-
tractor is an obvious alternative to a lawsuit against the OFCCP. A
114. Id. In Moon v. Roadway Express, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Ga. 1977),
it took one year for the OFCCP to determine that there was a violation of Section 503,
even though the facts were virtually undisputed. Interview with Beverly M. Bates, at-
torney for plaintiff (September 30, 1978).
115. A hopeful sign with respect to the burden of litigation is indicated in
Johnson v. Department Admin. Serv.'s, No. 1-77-348 (S.D. Ohio 1978). In Johon., the
court awarded attorneys' fees to the prevailing plaintiff in a Section 504 handicap
discrimination suit. This decision was rendered before Section 504 was amended to in-
clude a provision for attorney's fees.
In Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977), the district court
allowed attorneys' fees in a Section 503 suit brought directly against the City, a
federal contractor. [1978] EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) 8635.
The criteria for permitting recovery of attorneys' fees frequently cited by the
courts are found in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir.
1974).
116. To date the district courts are divided on the issue of whether a private
remedy under Section 503 should be implied. See note 24, supra.
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plaintiff suing a government contractor for discrimination has two
theories on which he may base his cause of action: the doctrine of
implied remedies, and third party beneficiary contract theory.
Implying civil remedies from statutes not specifically authoriz-
ing them has a long history in the federal courts.117 The theoretical
basis for such actions is analogous to that of tort negligence per se.
That is, the legislature passes a statute in order to require a certain
standard of conduct for the benefit of a class of persons. When a
person regulated by the statute fails to conform to the-established
standard, the persons within the protected class damaged by the
violation have a cause of action. Private rights of action thus serve
as means of enforcing the statute..8 and re-distributing the losses
caused by non-compliance.
Although the courts are divided on the issue of whether relief
should be permitted in direct actions against non-compliant govern-
ment contractors, they are unanimous in their choice of analysis."9
The courts have agreed that the four relevant factors which the
Supreme Court articulated in Cort v. Ash,' are dispositive. These
factors are:
1) Is the plaintiff a member of the especial class for
whose benefit the statute was enacted;''
2) Is there any indication of explicit or implicit
legislative intent to either create or deny a private
remedy;
3) Would a private right of action be consistent with the
purposes of the underlying legislative scheme;"
4) Is the cause of action one which is traditionally the
concern of the states.
117: See note 24, supra. See generally Note, Implying Remedies From Federal
Statutes, 77 HARV. L. REV. 285 (1963); Note, Implied Private Actions Under Federal
Statutes-The Emergence of a Conservative Doctrine, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 429
(1976).
118. Justice Douglas often referred to this as the "Private Attorney General"
concept. See, e.g., Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970).
119. See cases cited in note 24 supra.
120. 422 U.S. 65 (1975).
121. J.1. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431-35 (1964).
122. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971); Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corp., 485 F.2d 986,
989-99 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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Obviously no one disputes that qualified handicapped persons
are within the class for whose especial benefit Section 503 of the
Rehabilitation Act was enacted."= Moreover, a plaintiff seeking
relief from discrimination on the basis of handicap is alleging in-
fringement of the right which Section 503 was intended to create. 124
As the Supreme Court has noted on other occasions, where federally
created rights have been invaded it is the duty of the courts to be
alert to provide remedies which will effectuate those rights.15 The
plaintiff alleging that he is a qualified handicapped individual
discriminated against on the basis of his handicap in employment
with a government contractor thus satisfies the first relevant factor
of Cort. Indeed, some commentators have concluded that this is the
most crucial of the four factors."
Whether there is any indication of legislative intent either to
create or deny a private right of action is the second factor relevant
to the determination of whether a private right of action should be
implied from Section 503. Evidence of explicit legislative intent one
way or the other is non-existent with respect to Section 503.
Although there is no express indication of legislative intent to
create or deny a private cause of action, an absence of explicit in-
tent is not dispositive of this factor. As Justice Brennan explained
in Cort: "[I]n situations in which it is clear that federal law has
granted a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show
an intent to create a private cause of action, although an explicit
purpose to deny such a remedy would be controlling."' However,
the absence of explicit legislative intent on a private right to sue re-
quires some inquiry into implicit legislative intent.
In Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., the first reported decision in-
volving a plivate right of action under Section 503, the court con-
cluded that Congress implicitly intended to deny a private right of
action under Section 50 3 .2" The court based its conclusion on the
fact that Cogress provided a complaint procedure for administrative
enforcement of the Act and rejected numerous attempts to amend
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to include handicapped persons.
Title VII amendment would provide handicapped persons with an
123. Moon v. Roadway Express, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200, 202 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
124. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701, 793 (1976); See also S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 1, at
28.
125. J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964).
126. Seng, Private Rights of Action, 27 DEPAUL L. REV. 11 (1978). See also
Piper Inc. v. Chris Craft Industries, Inc. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
127. 422 U.S. at 82 (emphasis in original).
128. 433 F. Supp. 200, 202 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
129. Id. Accord, Wright, supra note 46, at 92.
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explicit right to sue. Congress, the court maintained, did not intend
to bestow a right of action upon qualified handicapped individuals.1"
Whatever light the failure of Congress to amend Title VII
sheds on Congress' intent with respect to a private right of action
under Section 503 is extremely dim. A more probable conclusion to
be drawn from Congress' failure to amend Title VII is that it was
unwilling to extend employment protection on as broad a scale as Ti-
tle VII, which covers nearly all employers in the United States."'
Rather, because of the potentially burdensome accommodations re-
quired for employment of handicapped persons, Congress chose to
proceed cautiously in this new area." By confining for the present
the newly created rights in qualified handicapped individuals to
situations involving federal financial assistance and government con-
tracts, Congress could ensure that accommodation costs would be
borne equitably. Accommodation costs can, in this manner, be passed
on to the federal government by the terms of the contract.1
Even though Congress was cautious in its extension of rights
to handicapped individuals with respect to employment, no ground
exists for the conclusion that these rights would not be vigorously
enforced. The legislative history abounds with evidence that Section
503 was considered tantamount to a bill of rights for handicapped in-
dividuals which carried out the intent of the sponsors of the amend-
ments to Title VII." The complaint procedure nowhere appears in
130. 433 F. Supp. at 202.
131. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b) (1976), defines "employer" as "a person engaged
in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each
working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceeding
year .... "
132. In 1978 Congress moved one step closer to providing full statutory
remedies to handicapped persons protected under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act by
granting an express private cause of action under Sections 501 and 504 of the Act. 29
U.S.C. §§ 791, 793. Section 503 was the subject of a similar proposed amendment, but
the amendment failed in Congress.
133. See 41 C.F.R. § 60-741.32 (1977), which provides that costs of accommoda-
tion may be charged to the government in accordance with the disputed clause of the
contract.
134. Senator Humphrey, the sponser of the Rehabilitation Act, emphasized
that the Act carried out his intentions in attempting to amend Title VI:
[Tihis bill correctly emphasized the need to make services responsive to
individual needs, and to make every effort to enable a handicapped person
to lead a productive and financially independent life.
I welcome the additional requirement in this bill for an affirmative
action program under which Federal contractors shall undertake to
employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals.
Moreover, another section of this bill specifically prohibits discrimination
against an otherwise qualified handicapped or severely handicapped in-
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the legislative history as an exclusive remedy for violations of the
Act."' The legislative history indicates, instead, that Congress was
intent on establishing the rights of the handicapped in these
selected areas.'"
In conjunction with the inference which the Rogers court
drew from the failure of Congress to amend Title VII, the court
found that because Congress provided an administrative remedy in
the complaint procedure, all other remedies were excluded. The
court based its conclusion on the maxim of statutory construction
expressio unius est exclusio alterius; the expression of one thing ex-
cludes all others. The Rogers court relied on National Railroad
Passenger Corp. v. National Association of Railroad Passengers
(hereinafter Amtrack)"s In Amtrack, a suit brought by railroad
passengers to enjoin discontinuance of certain routes, the Court
said: "When legislation provides a particular remedy or remedies,
courts should not expand coverage of the statute to subsume other
remedies.""' The application of this doctrine creates a presumption
against implication which can only be rebutted by evidence which af-
firmatively shows that Congress did not intend the designated
remedy to be exclusive.'
dividual, solely by reason of his or her handicap, resulting in that person
being excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of, any pro-
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
I am deeply gratified at the inclusion of these provisions, which
carry through the intent of original bills which I introduced jointly with
the Senator from Illinois (Mr. Percy) in the last Congress, S.3044 and
S.3458, to amend respectively Title VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, to guarantee the right of persons with a mental or physical handicap
to participate in programs receiving Federal assistance and to make
discrimination in employment because of these handicaps, and in the
absence of bonafide occupational qualification an unlawful employment
practice. The time has come to firmly establish the right of these
Americans to dignity and self-respect as equal and contributing members
of society and to end the virtual isolation of millions of children and
adults from society.
119 CONG. REC. 635 (1973) (emphasis added).
135. See Duran v. City of Tampa, 451 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Fla. 1978); Drennon v.
Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809, 815 (1977).
136. An inference of Congress' intent in passing the Rehabilitation Act and
achieving its goals can be drawn from the fact that both the 1973 Act and the 1974
Amendments were passed by overwhelming margins after Presidential veto. See [19731
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2076; [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373.
137. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
138. Id. at 458.
139.
Since the Amtrack Act creates a public cause of action for the en-
forcement of its provisions and a private cause of action only under very
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Government contractors opposed to implication argue that Con-
gress provided a specific remedy in the complaint procedure which
is presumed to be exclusive. There is no contrary evidence of
legislative intent to rebut this presumption. Therefore, private
rights of action are excluded on the principal of expressio unius."0
The expressio unius argument has a serious logical flaw which
courts have too frequently ignored in their mechanical application of
the doctrine. Expressio unius is a rule of presumed intention which
assumes that the draftsman has made a comprehensive review of all
of the provisions of a statute from which the inference might be
drawn that silence indicates a considered judgment of rejection. At-
tributing such omniscience to Congress is clearly unrealistic."'
There is no indication whatsoever that the draftsmen of Section 503
gave any consideration to the effect specification of a complaint pro-
cedure would have on implication of other remedies. Presumably
limited circumstances, this maxim would clearly compel the conclusion
that the remedies created in § 307(a) are the exclusive means to enforce
the duties and obligations imposed by the Act. But even the most basic
general principles of statutory construction must yield to clear contrary
evidence of legislative intent.
Id, (emphasis added).
140. Woods v. Diamond State Tel. & Tel., 440 F. Supp. 1003, 1004 (D. Del.
1977); Moon v. Roadway Express, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 1308 (N.D. Ga. 1977); Rogers v.
Frito-Lay., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200, 201 (N.D. Tex. 1977). See Wright, supra note 46, at
91-92.
141. Use of this rule of statutory construction is unwise, especially in
making such a complex determination as that of implied private rights of
action. ... Given the nature of the legislative process, often resulting in
compromise and ambiguous language, and given the complexity of
statutes and schemes of regulation, such a factor, which focuses only on
the express terms of the statute, is of limited use, especially if the statute
has broad remedial purposes .... Apparently, a majority of courts would
refuse to consider it controlling for the purpose of establishing legislative
intent because the rule often establishes nothing but only raises further
questions.
Not only has the rule of expressio unius been rejected generally,
but also, courts repeatedly have refused to apply the maxim in implica-
tion cases. Whether defined liberally or strictly, implication requires the
court to look beyond the express language of the statute. As the ex-
pressio unius rationale includes a presumption against any such extension
of statutes, it is inherently inimical to implication. No case adopting this
rule as controlling ever has inferred a private right of action. In Amtrak
this restrictive principle was used to raise an almost irrebutable [sic]
presumption against implication. Although such a severe construction was
not applied in Cort restrictive application of the principle was not ex-
pressly rejected.
18 WM. & MARY L. REV., supra note 117, at 452-53.
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Congress considered the complaint procedure to be one mechanism
through which the purposes of the Act could be achieved. Congress
could not know how effective the procedure, unsupplemented, would
be in actual practice. Clearly the courts should not over-emphasize
the fact that an act provides one administrative remedy when con-
sidering whether to imply a judicial remedy from the statute.
The Supreme Court in a unanimous opinion in Cort v. Ash,
clarified the application of the doctrine of expressio unius as applied
in Amtrack. The Court noted that in Amtrack there was a private
cause of action provided in favor of certain plaintiffs, employees of
the railroads, concerning the particular provision at issue. It was in
that context that the doctrine was applied.'42 In addition the Court
found that there was specific support in the legislative history of
the Amtrack Act for the proposition that the statutory remedies
were to be exclusive.""3 Under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act,
there is neither an express right of action in favor of certain plain-
tiffs nor specific support in the legislative history for the proposi-
tion that the complaint procedure was to be exclusive.
On other occasions the Supreme Court rejected a mechanical
application of expressio unius in order to provide remedies, the need
for which was not apparent when the statute was drafted. In Allen
v. State Board of Elections,'" the Court implied a private cause of
action from the Voting Rights Act in spite of the fact that the Act
provided for elaborate administrative enforcement mechanisms." 5
The Court found that the achievement of the Act's laudable goal
would be severely hampered if each citizen were required to depend
solely on litigation instituted at the discretion of the limited staff of
the Attorney General. '"
142. In Cor4 the opponents of an implied remedy asked the Court to infer from
the fact that some private remedy was provided with regard to one section of the
statute in question, all other private remedies were excluded on the principle of ex-
pressio unius. The Court responded:
We find this excursion into extrapolation of legislative intent en-
tirely unilluminating. In Amtrack, there was a private cause of action in
favor of certain plaintiffs concerning the particular provision at issue
[employees]. It was in this context that we referred to . . . [expressio
unius]. In addition, there was specific support in the legislative history of
the Amtrack Act for the proposition that the statutory remedies were to
be exclusive.
422 U.S. at 82 n.14.
143. Id; Amtrack, 414 U.S. at 458.
144. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
145. Id. at 556-57.
146. Id.
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Similarly, in J.L Case v. Borak, "7 a case brought by an investor
alleging damages from violations of the Securities and Exchange
Act, the Court implied a private right of action to supplement
Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement.14 8 Approving of
Borak and similar cases, the Court recently reaffirmed its position
that administrative remedies specified in an act are not dispositive
on the issue of implication. "9 The Court has taken the position that
where necessary to ensure the effectiveness of congressionally
created rights, private remedies will be implied to protect the par-
ticular class for whose benefit the statute was enacted.
The Court's alertness to supplement specific statutory
remedies with private remedies militates in favor of implication of a
private right of action under Section 503. As in Allen and Borak, the
administrative remedies are inadequate to ensure that congressional
goals will be realized.110 Blind reliance on a mechanical application of
the doctrine of expressio unius to exclude private enforcement of the
Act may result in the subversion of these goals.
Moreover, in most cases involving implication, it is unlikely
that any conclusive evidence of congressional intent on the issue of
private remedies will be found in the legislative history or from
statutory construction. One who claims to have found congressional
intent either to create or deny a private cause of action is left with
a puzzling problem: why, if Congress had definite intentions on the
matter, did it fail to express its intention on the face of the
statute? 5 ' The truth of the matter is that in most instances a search
147. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
148. Id. at 434-35.
149. The reasoning of these holdings is that, where congressional pur-
poses are likely to be undermined absent private enforcement, private
remedies may be implied in favor of the particular class intended to be
protected by the statute.
Indeed, the Court in Borak carefully noted that because of practical
limitation upon the SEC's enforcement capabilities, '[pirivate enforcement
... provides a necessary supplement to Commission action.' 377 U.S. at
432. (Emphasis added). Similarly, the Court's opinion in Blue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975), in reaffirming the
availability of a private right of action under § 10(b), specifically alluded
to the language in Borak concerning the necessity for supplemental
private remedies without which congressional protection of shareholders
would be defeated.
Piper Inc. v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 25 (1977).
150. See text supra, at notes 66 to 70.
151. See 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. supra note 117, at 452-53; Note, Private
Rights of Action" Some Implications for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392, 1405
(1974).
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of legislative history or application of principles of statutory con-
struction is meant to find evidence of what Congress would have
said had it considered the issue of private remedies. The absence of
conclusive evidence of legislative intent from either the legislative
history or statutory construction of Section 503 suggests that the
other factors articulated in Cort should be dispositive."2 Perhaps sec-
ond only to whether the plaintiff is in the especial class, the ques-
tion of whether implication of a private remedy would be consistent
with the underlying legislative scheme and purpose of Section 503
must be considered.
The purpose of the legislative scheme underlying Section 503 is
clearly to expand employment opportunities with government con-
tractors for qualified handicapped individuals.'5 Congress provided
qualified handicapped persons with one means of effectuating this
purpose through the complaint procedure. If an additional private
remedy is to be implied from the Act, courts must find that the ad-
ditional remedy is consistent both with the goal of expanding
employment opportunity for handicapped persons and with the
existing enforcement scheme. Opponents of implication of a private
remedy under Section 503 contend that private lawsuits enforcing
the Act are inconsistent with the legislative scheme.'" They argue
that private litigation would not advance employment opportunities
for handicapped individuals and would disrupt orderly enforcement
of the OFCCP program.
In suppport of their contention that a private cause of action
would not promote employment opportunity, opponents of private
remedies under Section 503 maintain that application of traditional
litigation concepts of discrimination does not apply in the handicap
bias situation. Unlike race, opponents of implication assert that a
handicap may directly affect the ability to perform a certain job.
Race is not inherently inconsistent with ability; disability is.
Because disability directly affects job performance, the courts have
no judicially manageable standards which they can apply. The lack
of appropriate standards would result in sporadic and inconsistent
152. In Mason v. Beliu, 543 F.2d 215, 221 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852
(1976), the court held that where there is no clear indication of legislative intent to per-
mit or deny a private remedy, the decision should be based on the remaining three fac-
tors of Cort v. Ash.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 701(6) (1976).
154. Wright, supra note 46, is the leading commentator opposing a private
remedy under Section 503. Mr. Wright was counsel for the defense in Rogers v. Frito-
Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
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enforcement of Section 503 which would have no appreciable impact
on employment of handicapped persons."
The argument that traditional discrimination concepts are inap-
propriate in handicap discrimination cases is unpersuasive in the
Section 503 context. Section 503 explicitly limits its coverage to
otherwise qualified handicapped individuals. This means that a hand-
icapped individual must meet the essential qualifications for a job in
order to be protected." For instance a person with only a right arm
has a disability, but the same person is unimpaired in relation to
jobs which only require one arm. The employer may only disqualify
a person for job performance related impairments. 57 Once ability to
perform a job is determined, the question of whether the employer
has invidiously discriminated against someone on the basis of hand-
icap is as amenable to judicial resolution as is a case involving
discrimination based on sex.'-
Determination of discrimination on the basis of race or sex is
actually similar to discrimination on the basis of handicap in many
instances. Discrimination which results from the use of selection
criteria unrelated to job performance is prohibited in all cases in-
volving government contractors." 9 Physical requirements such as
155. Rogers v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 433 F. Supp. at 202; Wright, supra note 46, at
92-94.
156. See text supra, at notes 42 to 49.
157. See Lang, Protecting the Handicapped from Employment Discrimination:
The Job-Relatedness and Bona Fide Occupation Qualification Doctrines, 27 DEPAUL L.
REV. 989 (1978).
158. See LaFluer v. Board of Education, 414 U.S. 646 (1974); Halderman v.
Penhurst, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
159. The standard for determining whether a job selection criterion is a job
related qualification was enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971): "The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment prac-
tice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job perfor-
mance, the practice is prohibited." Id. at 431. This comports well with the OFCCP
definition of "qualified handicapped individual" as one who "is capable of performing a
particular job, with reasonable accommodation to his or her handicap." 41 C.F.R. §
60-741.2 (1977).
Cf. The test used in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir.
1976), an age discrimination law suit:
[Ilf all or substantially all members of a class do not qualify for a
particular position, or if there is no practical way reliably to differentiate
the qualified from the unqualified applicants in that class, it is then that
... otherwise proscribed discrimination is permitted as a BFOQ [bona fide
occupational qualification].
As Wright, supra note 46, at 73, suggested, this test had the effect of exempting bus
driving from the Age Discrimination Act. In like manner certain types of positions
could be exempted from Section 503 requirements. For example, since perfect eye-
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height,"e weight,"'1 or physical strength,"2 when not job related,
have been held to be sexually or racially discriminatory. Job
qualifications, such as 20/20 vision"3 or having no history of epileptic
attacks,'" when not truly related to bona fide job requirements
unreasonably discriminate against the class of persons lacking those
qualifications. By ignoring actual abilities and focusing on
disabilities, such employment practices relegate entire classes to in-
ferior positions.1 15 The vast experience of the courts in dealing with
these types of factors suggests that courts can adequately deal with
discrimination on the basis of handicap using traditional equal oppor-
tunity concepts.
Aside from the contention that a private remedy under Section
503 should fail because of the lack of judicially applicable standards,
opponents of implication argue that private lawsuits against contrac-
tors would undermine orderly enforcement of the Act by the OFCCP.
They point to the legislative history which stresses the importance
sight is essential for airline pilots, Section 503 would impose no obligations on airlines
to accommodate pilots with visual impairments.
160. Dothard v. Raulinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Davis v. County of Los Angeles,
EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 11,219 (9th Cir. 1976); [19761 EEOC DECISIONS (CCH) 6223.
161. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Meadows v.
Ford Motor Co., 62 F.R.D. 98 (W.D. Ky. 1973), modified on other grounds, 510 F.2d 939
(6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub nom., Local Union 682, U.A.W. v. Ford Motor Co., 425
U.S. 998 (1976); Redinger v. General Motors Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 474 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1972).
162. Long v. Sapp, 502 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1974); Bowe v. Colgate Palmolive Co.,
416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1970); Nance v. Union Carbide Corp., 397 F. Supp. 436 (W.D.N.C.
1975).
163. See Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 556 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1977); Nuld v. American
Hockey League, 439 F. Supp. 459 (W.D.N.Y. 1977).
164. See Duran v. City of Tampa, 430 F. Supp. 75 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
165. See LaFluer v. Board of Education, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Halderman v.
Penhurst, 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1978). See generally Burgdorf & Burgdorf, supra
note 1, at 899-910.
In LaFluer, a case dealing with the validity of teachers' mandatory pregnancy
leaves after the fifth month of pregnancy, the court observed:
While the medical experts in these cases differed on many points, they
unanimously agreed on one-the ability of any particular pregnant woman
to continue at work past any fixed time in her pregnancy is very much an
individual matter. Even assuming, arguendo, that there are some women
who would be physically unable to work past the particular cutoff dates
embodied in the challenged rules, it is evident that there are large
numbers of teachers who are fully capable of continuing work for longer
than the . . . regulations allow. Thus the conclusive presumption in these
rules . . . is 'neither necessarily nor universally true;' and is violative of
the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 645-46.
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of consistent interpretation of Section 503 and its companion Sec-
tions 501 and 504.16 This consistency was considered essential for
the success of the entire program. 167 The critics of implied remedies
maintain that private enforcement would result in a patchwork of in-
consistent adjudications. 68 Agency enforcement, on the other hand,
would result in consistent application of standards adopted in the
regulations.
The impact of the argument that an implied remedy under Sec-
tion 503 would disrupt consistent interpretation of the requirements
of the Act is substantially dissipated by the fact that only qualified
handicapped individuals are protected under Section 503. As discussed
above, federal contractors are not required to ignore handicapping
conditions when making employment decisions. They are merely re-
quired to make sure that discrimination on the basis of handicap is
rationally related to business necessity. The requirements of Section
503 thus require no special expertise which the courts do not
already possess from dealing with discrimination in other contexts. 9
Nor is the OFCCP a specialized regulatory agency charged with
broad discretionary powers to control a complex industrial or com-
mercial relationship. 7' Instead Section 503 gives rights to handicapped
employees and gives the OFCCP some powers to help achieve those
rights.
166. See S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 1, at 4.
167. See WRIGHT, supra note 46 at 90-95.
168. Id.
169. In Fagot v. Flinkote Co., 305 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. La. 1969), the court found
that a private litigant could sue for back wages because of violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act. The court observed that although the Department of Labor was charged
with enforcement of the FLSA, a private right of action would not interfere with agency
enforcement. The court noted, "[t]he FLSA is not a regulatory law delegating broad
discretionary responsibility to a specialized administrative agency charged with govern-
ing an industry or phase of commercial relations. Instead, it bestows a series of rights
on a broad class of employees, and arms the Secretary of Labor with extensive power
to help the employees to enforce those rights." Id. at 413. Cf. Montana-Dakota Util. Co.
v. Northwestern Pub]. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951) (determination of reasonableness
of power rates left to broad discretion of Federal Power Commission); accord T.I.M.E.,
Inc., v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959) (similar situation involving reasonableness of
freight rates; held, a matter for the Interstate Commerce Commission).
Similarly, Section 503 grants rights to a broad class of employees and arms the
OFCCP with powers to help employees derive the intended benefit from the act.
However, there is no indication that the Department of Labor has special expertise in
this area or is given the kind of broad discretion found in other regulatory schemes
such as those in the Federal Power Act and the Motor Carrier Act.
170. 120 CONG. REC. 30534 (1974). See Drennon v. Philadelphia Gen. Hosp., 428
F. Supp. 809, 815 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
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In a related context, 7' Justice Stevens applied the Cort test to
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act 7 ' which prohibits discrimination on
the basis of race, color, or national origin by recipients of federal
financial assistance. In the context of the entire legislative scheme,
Stevens found no conflict between the administrative mechanism pre-
scribed in Title VI and a private remedy against a non-compliant recip-
ient of federal aid.' Title VI only provides explicitly for judicial review
of enforcing agency or department actions. 7' Administrative enforce-
ment of Title VI focuses on compliance reviews, negotiated set-
tlements, and in the event negotiations fail, termination of fund-
ing. However, Stevens concluded that because administrative en-
forcement is geared to cutting off federal funds and not vindication
of personal rights, a private lawsuit to secure individual rights was
compatible with existing administrative remedies.
Similarly, administrative enforcement of Section 503 is geared
to negotiations backed up by a threat of contract cancellation or
debarment for non-compliance. Permitting an individual to sue for
cancellation would clearly be inconsistent with the purposes of the
administrative scheme. However, a private action seeking relief only
for an alleged violation is wholly compatible with administrative en-
forcement. A private action may in fact be the only means of secur-
ing these personal rights.
Moreover, there is evidence in the legislative history that the
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, which reported the Reha-
bilitation Act, approved of a private cause of action under Section
504 of the Act. 5 Every Circuit Court of Appeals which faced the
issue of whether Section 504 enforcement should be supplemented
171. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
173. 438 U.S. at 419 nn.26-28.
174. As Judge Carter, commenting on Bakke, noted:
It seems to this court that a deliberate intention not to afford a
private right of action under Title VI is too much to infer from the omis-
sion of express language. Congress mentions private rights of action
under Titles VII and II only while also specifying restrictions upon the ex-
ercise of those rights that do not normally obtain in a federal court. Fail-
ing to create an express private right of action under Title VI is,
therefore, wholly consistent with Congress' explicitly creating causes of
action only where it also established procedural prerequisites that differ
from those ordinarily obtaining in federal courts.
Guardians Assoc. of New York v. New York City Civil Service Comm'n, 47 U.S.L.W.
2561 (1979).
175. 120 CONG. REc. 30534 (1974); S. REP. No. 1297, supra note 1, at 26-27.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 13, No. 3 [1979], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol13/iss3/2
REHABILITATION A CT
with a private right of action before the Act was amended to include
one, has agreed that private enforcement is consistent with the
Act.1 7' Given Congress' intent that Sections 503 and 504 be inter-
preted consistently, these decisions militate in favor of implication
of a private remedy under Section 503.
A direct action by aggrieved handicapped individuals would
provide an effective supplement to enforcement of Section 503 by
OFCCP compliance reviews. The limited staff of the agency, now
directing its attention away from individual complaint proceedings,
would be reinforced by handicapped individuals acting as private at-
torneys general enforcing the Act. While the OFCCP concentrates
on eradication of systematic discrimination and prospective broaden-
ing of opportunities, private litigants could seek recovery of
wrongfully withheld back wages. Indeed, as the Supreme Court
recognized in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,'7 back pay has an ob-
vious connection with the purposes of achieving equality of employ-
ment because of the burdens it imposes on employers:
If employers faced only the prospect of an injunctive
order, they would have little incentive to shun practices of
dubious legality. It is the reasonably certain prospect of a
back pay award that provides the spur or catalyst which
causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-
evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to
eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfor-
tunate and ignominious page in this country's history.' 8
Thus, a private right of action appears to be entirely consistent with
the legislative purpose behind Section 503 of expanding employment
opportunities for qualified handicapped individuals.
In addition to consistency with the legislative scheme, con-
siderations involving legislative intent, and whether the plaintiff is
within the special class for whose benefit the statute was enacted,
Cort v. Ash requires inquiry into existing state remedies in deter-
mining whether a remedy should be implied from a federal statute.'
7 9
176. The leading case under Section 504 implying a private right of action is
Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977). Accord, Davis v.
Southeastern Comm. College, 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978); Kampmeir v. Nyquist, 553
F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1977); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 550 F.2d 413 (8th Cir.
1977).
177. 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
178. Id. at 417 (citations omitted in original).
179. 422 U.S. at 84-85. The thrust of the argument in favor of implying a
remedy where federal law is silent was noted in the Court's analysis of J.I. Case v.
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If the area legislated is traditionally an area of state law, there is
generally no need to provide plaintiffs with an additional forum. 8'
On the other hand, if state law should happen to impose no liability
on the particular conduct at issue, then the argument for implication
of a right to sue is strengthened."'
Although fifteen states do not have laws which offer protection
to handicapped individuals,"12 protection from employment
discrimination has not been relegated to the states.113 No prohibition
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434-35 (1964):
In Borak ... we said '[I]f the law of the state happened to attach no
responsibility to the use of misleading proxy statements, the whole pur-
pose of § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 might be
frustrated. 377 U.S. at 434-35 .... In Borak, the statute involved was
clearly an intrusion of federal law into the internal affairs of corporations;
to the extent that state law differed or impeded suits, the congressional




182. See Cook, Non-discrimination in Employment Under the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 39 nn.53-60 (1978), for an exhaustive recitation of all
state laws concerning the handicapped.
The following states, territories, and possessions have no statutes protecting
handicapped persons from discrimination in employment: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Canal Zone, Colorado, Deleware, Georgia, Guam, Idaho, Louisiana, Missouri, Oklahoma,
Puerto Rico, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Virgin Islands, Virginia, and
Wyoming.
183. See the following state statutes on handicap discrimination: ALASKA STAT.
§ 18.80.220(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1420(a), 1432.5 (West Supp. 1979);
CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-1f, 31-126(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979); D.C. CODE ENCYL. §§ 6-1504,
-1508 (West Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 413.08(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1979); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 378-1(7), -2, -9 (1968 & Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 65-23 (Smith-
Hurd 1977); IND. CODE §§ 22-9-1-2, -3(q), -13 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601A.2(11), .6(1),
.7(1), .8(1) (West 1975); KAN. STAT. §§ 44-1001, -1002(j), -1009(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978); Ky.
REV. STAT. §§ 207.130(2), .150(1) (Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, §§ 4552, 4553.7-A,
4572 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 17, 18(g), 19(a), 20 (Cum. Supp. 1978); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 24K (Cum. Supp. 1978); MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.550(103)(b),
(202) (Rev. Vol. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01, Subd. 25, .03, Subd. 1(2) (Cum. Supp.
1978); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-6-15 (Cum. Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. §§
64-305(10), (13), -306(1)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-1102(8), 1104,
1108(1) (Supp. 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 613.330, .350(1), (2) (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 354-A:3(13), -A:8 (Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4.1, -5(q) (West 1978); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 4-33-2(k), -7 (1975); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 292(21), 296(1), (1-a) (McKinney
Cum. Supp. 1972-1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 128-15.3 (Cum. Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 4112.01(k), (m), .02(A) (Baldwin 1976); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 659.400, .425 (1975); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 954(p), 955 (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978-79); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
art. 4419e, §§ 28-5-6(H), -7 (Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4131 (Supp. 1978); TEX.
REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4419e §§ 1, 3(g) (1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 498 (Cum.
Supp. 1978); VA. CODE § 40.1-28.7 (Repl. vol. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.180 (Supp.
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against employment discrimination existed at common law. Until the
period of the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960's, few states
enacted statutes aimed at employment discrimination. State statutes
regarding handicap employment discrimination enacted since the
Civil Rights period vary considerably in the degree of protection af-
forded."" On the other hand, the federal government led the fight
combatting employment discrimination on the basis of handicap as
well as on the basis of other classifications.18 These facts indicate
that this is not an area of traditional state interest or state concern.
Moreover, the federal government has a special interest in
regulating employment discrimination in the Section 503 context
because of the special relationship the government has with govern-
ment contractors. State laws regulating discrimination on the basis
of handicap are passed pursuant to a state's police powers.
Unrelated to this, Congress imposed the requirements of Section 503
on employers through the existence of a contractual relationship
with the employer. Section 503 is an example of the government's
powers to fix terms and conditions on which it will make needed
purchases in order to implement national policies.' By accepting
the terms of the contract, employers covered by the Act choose to
bind themselves to the affirmative action mandate. Because state
statutes and Section 503 are based on different premises of power,
implication of a private federal remedy would not invade an area of
state law where adequate remedies may or may not exist.
Implication of a private right of action from Section 503 is thus
consistent with the four relevant factors prescribed by the Supreme
Court in Cort v. Ash. Qualified handicapped individuals are within
the special class of persons protected by the statute. The legislative
history, although inconclusive when examined for evidence of intent
to bestow a private right of action on handicapped persons, does not
indicate an explicit intent to deny a private cause of action to per-
1978); W. VA. CosE § 5-11-9 (Cum. Supp. 1978); WIs. STAT. Ann. §§ 111.32(5)(a), (f) (West
1974 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
184. A number of states protect only the physically handicapped. E.g., FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 413.08(3) (Supp. 1979); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-6-15 (Supp. 1978).
185. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-2000h-6, 3601-3631 (1976).
186. The freedom of the government to use its purchasing powers in order to
accomplish social goals was recognized in Perkins v. Luken Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113
(1940), in which the Court stated: "[T]he Government enjoys the unrestricted power to
produce its own supplies, to determine those with whom it will deal, and to fix the
terms upon which it will make needed purchases." I& at 127. In Perkins, the power of
the government to set a minimum wage for employees of government contractors was
upheld. See 41 U.S.C. § 35 (1976).
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sons covered by the statute. In fact the unsatisfactory enforcement
efforts of the OFCCP, the agency charged with responsibility for en-
forcing the Act, suggests that the absence of a private cause of ac-
tion for qualified handicapped individuals may undermine the con-
gressional purposes of Section 503. The increasing stress of the OFCCP
on compliance reviews of federal contractors suggests that a private
cause of action will provide a necessary supplement to agency
action. Athough the states have taken some steps toward elimi-
nating handicap bias, a federal cause of action based on Section 503
would not offend any state programs, primiarly because of the con-
tractual relationship between the United States and federal contrac-
tors.
There are a number of pitfalls and limitations on a private
right of action against a federal contractor. Time and expense are
two major considerations which any person contemplating a private
action cannot ignore. The doctrines of primary jurisdiction and ex-
haustion of administrative remedies are also likely to pose some prob-
lems for the potential handicap discrimination plaintiff. However,
before considering these matters, the potential plaintiff may also
want to examine an alternative direct civil action theory based on
contract doctrine.
DIRECT CIVIL ACTION AGAINST NON-COMPLIANT FEDERAL
CONTRACTORS UNDER SECTION 503: THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
Although Section 503 lawsuits brought by private litigants
against non-compliant government contractors have focused on the
Cort v. Ash analysis, a theory of relief sounding in contract deserves
attention. A qualified handicapped individual who is employed by or
is an applicant for employment with a government contractor is a
third-party beneficiary of the contract between the United States
and the contractor by virtue of the non-discrimination clause
prescribed by Section 503. The handicapped individual must
establish that the contract has bestowed upon him rigohts which he
can enforce. In contract terms, the plaintiff must prove that he is an
intended beneficiary of the contract. Although the law is somewhat
unsettled on this issue, there are indications which suggest the
availability of a contractual remedy.
Modern contract doctrine suggests that a contract remedy is
available for qualified handicapped individuals under the non-
discrimination clause.187 Section 145 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
187. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (Tent. Drafts No.'s 1-7
(1973).
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OF CONTRACTS states that third party beneficiaries may sue to en-
force their rights under a government contract unless such law suits
would contravene the policy of the law authorizing the contract or
prescribing remedies for its breach.' " The rationale accompanying
the RESTATEMENT indicates that provision in the statute for govern-
ment control over the litigation and settlement of claims is a factor
which would make a direct action against a contractor inap-
propriate.1 " Although there is an interest in orderly enforcement of
the Act by the compliance agency, it is apparent that the OFCCP is
increasingly putting its enforcement efforts on compliance reviews
and prospective remedies. 9 ' This change in focus militates in favor
of a supplemental private remedy for specific acts of non-compliance
causing damage to individual handicapped employees.
188. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) clearly would consider qualified handicapped
persons intended beneficiaries within the meaning of § 133, which states:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a
beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a
right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the
intention of the parties and . . . (b) the circumstances indicate that the
promisee intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised per-
formance.
The intent to benefit handicapped individuals is self-evident from Section 503.
Moreover, the recognition of a right to performance in the beneficiary is explicit in the
statute's grant of a right to file a complaint with the Department of Labor in the event
of contractor non-compliance. Section 135 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) indicates that
an intended beneficiary can enforce the contract duty created by Section 503 of the
Rehabilitation Act. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 135 (Tent. Draft Nos.
1-7 (1973).
Special rules dealing with government contracts were adopted in the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND):
(1) The rules stated in this Chapter apply to contracts with a govern-
ment or governmental agency except to the extent that application would
contravene the policy of the law authorizing the contract or prescribing
remedies for its breach.
(2) In particular, a promisor who contracts with a government or govern-
mental agency to do an act for or render a service to the public is not
subject to contractual liability to a member of the public for consequential
damages resulting from performance or failure to perform unless
(a) the terms of the promise provide for such liability; or
(b) the promisee is subject to liability to the member of the
public for the damages and a direct action against the prom-
isor is consistent with the terms of the contract and with the
policy of the law authorizing the contract and prescribing
remedies for its breach.
Id at § 145.
189. ld. at § 145, Comment a.
190. See United States Department of Labor, COMPLIANCE REVIEW PRO-
CEDURES, supra note 56, at 9; [1978] Transfer Binder EMPL. PRAC. DEC. (CCH) 5027.
I
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The doctrine of the RESTATEMENT also requires that the terms
of the promise to the government provide for liability to third par-
ties damaged by a breach."1 The apparent purpose of this require-
ment is to limit the contractor's liability to those matters within the
contemplation of the parties. The non-discrimination clause does not
provide explicitly for liability to pay damages to handicapped in-
dividuals. This promise, however, can be implied from the clause.
The non-discrimination clause, which states that the contractor will
not discriminate against qualified handicapped individuals in any
employment practice, also provides that the contractor may be sub-
ject to actions for non-compliance.19 The OFCCP has already taken
the position that back wages are an appropriate remedy for non-
compliance. 19 Permitting individual handicapped persons to recover
back wages or seniority will not expose the contractor to any
greater liability than anticipated at the outset of the agreement.'"
No cases have been decided under Section 503 on third party
beneficiary analysis, 9 but the Supreme Court recently indicated its
willingness to accept this rationale in a related context. In Lau v.
Nichols,'" the Court granted relief to students in the San Francisco
school system claiming discrimination on the basis of national
origin. 97 The plaintiffs asserted their rights as third party
beneficiaries of a contract between the government and the school
system through which the school received federal financial
191. See note 188 supra.
192. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-741.4, 741-28 (1977).
193. See 65 UNITED STATES DEP'T. OF LABOR ANN. REP. FISCAL YEAR 1977 58
(1978).
194. Permitting recovery on the contract may in fact be better for the contrac-
tor than an implied remedy in terms of keeping liability within anticipated bounds. A
contractual remedy would be limited by the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng.
Dep. 145 (1854). On the other hand, a suit on an implied remedy might include damages
resulting from emotional suffering. The court's dismissal of Woods v. Diamond State
Tel. & Tel.. 440 F. Supp. 1003 (D. Del. 1977), a Section 503 suit, was in part based on
reluctance to expose federal contractors to excessive liability based on emotional
distress caused by handicap discrimination. Woods was brought on an implied
remedies theory under Section 503. Cf. Rogers v. Exxon Research and Eng'r Co., 404
F. Supp. 324 (D.N.J. 1975) (court permitted recovery for pain and suffering incurred by
an employee forced into retirement in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621).
195. But see Whittaker v. University of New York, No. 77C-2258 (E.D.N.Y.,
filed Nov. 14, 1977), in which the plaintiff alleged employment discrimination on the
basis of handicap in violation of Section 504. The plaintiff sued as a third party
benefieiary of a federal financial assistance contract.
196. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
197. Id. at 569.
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assistance. In return for the financial assistance, the Court found
that the school system contractually agreed not to discriminate on
the basis of national origin, pursuant to Section 601 of the Civil
Rights Act. '98
Similarly, in Gomez v. Florida State Employment Services,'"
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that migratory farm workers
could assert third party beneficiary rights in contracts entered
under the Wagner-Peyser Act.'" That Act provides a substantial
portion of the funding for state employment agencies. The court
found that by accepting funds from the federal government, the
state becomes contractually bound to the regulations governing
employment services as promulgated by the Department of Labor.
Likewise, employers who utilize the services of federally funded
state agencies also become contractually bound to the regulations.
The court held that migratory farm workers who were recruited by
employers through these agencies could enforce the Department of
Labor regulations relating to housing and terms of employment as
third party beneficiaries of the contracts."'
The analogy of Lau and Gomez to a law suit brought under Sec-
tion 503 is obvious. Government contractors agree to certain terms
and conditions in their contract for the benefit of qualified handicapped
individuals. These persons are in the best position to enforce these
provisions of the contract and will experience harm if they are not
enforced. 2 2 Therefore, a qualified handicapped individual should be
entitled to bring an action to enforce his rights as a third party
beneficiary."3 Of course a suit brought under either an implied
198. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). This section was the model for Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. 414 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring).
199. 417 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1969).
200. 29 U.S.C. §§ 49 et seq. (1976).
201. 417 F.2d at 572. A third party beneficiary cause of action has also been
upheld under the Hill-Burton Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 et seq. (1976), which provides as a
condition of receiving federal funds, a hospital must provide services to indigents. See
Euresti v. Stenner, 458 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1972); Corum v. Beth Israel Medical
Center, 339 F. Supp. 909 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Cook v. Ochaner Foundation Hosp., 319 F.
Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970).
202. See Drennon v. Philadelphia General Hosp., 428 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa.
1977). "The remedy sought in this case, the employment of plaintiff and members of
her class in positions from which they were purportedly excluded in violation of the
Rehabilitation Act, could not better foster the goals of the legislation in question." Id.
at 815.
203. But see the following cases which have denied a private right of action
under Executive Order 11246 on either a third party beneficiary or an implied
remedies theory: Weise v. Syracuse University, 522 F.2d 397 (2d Cir. 1975); Farkas v.
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remedies theory or third party beneficiary theory still confronts
other issues; in particular the doctrines of exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies and primary jurisdiction.
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND PRIMARY
JURISDICTION
The doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
primary jurisdiction are issues in a lawsuit against a non-compliant
federal contractor regardless of whether the suit is brought on an
implied remedies theory, third party beneficiary theory, or both.
Where applicable, exhaustion of administrative remedies is a pre-
condition to a lawsuit. The doctrine requires that before a plaintiff
may bring an action to the court he must seek whatever relief is
available to him from an agency which has jurisdiction over the con-
troversy.2 Primary jurisdiction, on the other hand, involves the
question of whether an agency or a court should make a determina-
tion in an action over which the court properly has jurisdiction. If
the court decides that an agency has particular expertise in an area,
then the court may defer to the agency in order to obtain the
benefit of that expertise while retaining jurisdiction over the suit.n5
Texas Instruments, Inc., 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1968);
Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964); Traylor v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 872 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 392
F. Supp. 188 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
The Executive Order 11246 cases are distinguishable on several grounds from
actions brought under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act. First, all of the cases ex-
cept Traylor were decided before the Supreme Court decided Cort v. Ash. Conse-
quently, the analysis of the Executive Order was undertaken without the benefit of
the factors considered relevant in Cort. Secondly, alternative means of enforcing the
rights guaranteed the protected class of Executive Order 11246 are available under 42
U.S.C. § 1981, which gives discriminatees the right to sue. See Lewis v. FMC Corp., 11
FAIR EMPL. PRAC. (BNA) 31, 34 (N.D. Cal. 1975). On the other hand, handicapped per-
sons have no alternative federal means of protecting their rights to be free from
discrimination in employment. Finally, there is some doubt as to whether the Presi-
dent has the ability, without congressional action, to create a right by Executive Order
which can be enforced by a private cause of action. See Masco v. United Airlines, 13
FAIR EMPL. PRAC. (BNA) 1549, 1551 (W.D. Pa. 1976). There is after Cort no doubt that
a private cause of action can be implied from a federal statute. Consequently, the cases
decided under Executive Order 11246 are not precisely on point with cases brought
under Section 503.
204. See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 20.01 (1958), for a detailed
analysis of the exhaustion rule.
205. See id. at § 19.01. The principle of primary jurisdiction was clearly ar-
ticulated in MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 496 F.2d 214 (3d
Cir. 1974):
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction has been developed by courts in
order to avoid conflict between the courts and an administrative agency
. I
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In the Section 503 context, the court will likely consider both ex-
haustion and primary jurisdiction.
A court may require a plaintiff under Section 503 to exhaust
the complaint procedure with the OFCCP before bringing suit
against a contractor. The reason likely to be advanced in support of
this requirement is that a private remedy should not be permitted
to undercut effective administrative remedies already provided or
unnecessarily burden the courts.'
Countering this argument is the question of whether the ad-
ministrative alternative under Section 503 is reasonable. When ex-
hausting administrative remedies would take an unreasonable
amount of time with a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff would
not receive the relief he is entitled to, the usual necessity of exhaus-
tion is not required."7 When unreasonable delays occurred in actions
brought before the National Railroad Adjustment Board, the
Supreme Court held that wrongfully discharged employees could
seek direct relief in the courts.2 Similarly, in Allen v. State Board
of Elections,' the Court held that because of the Attorney
General's limited staff, individual plaintiffs could seek direct relief
in the courts from violations of the Voting Rights Act.2"' In both of
these situations, the Court was impressed with the fact that the
agencies empowered to enforce the rights involved were inadequate.
The OFCCP's clear inadequacy in enforcing Section 503 militates
against requiring exhaustion.
On the other hand, a court which waives exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies as a formal pre-condition to suit might still in-
voke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Similar to exhaustion, the
rationale of primary jurisdiction is to avoid waste of judicial energy
arising from either the court's lack of expertise with the subject matter of
the agency's regulation or from contradictory rulings by the agency and
the court. Under the doctrine, a court should refer a matter to an ad-
ministrative agency for resolution, even if the matter is otherwise properly
before the court, if it appears that the matter involves technical or policy
considerations which are beyond the court's ordinary competence and
within the agency's particular field of expertise.
Id at 220.
206. See Lewis v. Western Airlines, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 684, 688 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
207. Duran v. City of Tampa, 451 F. Supp. 954 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
208. Walker v. Southern Ry. Co., 385 U.S. 196 (1966). See also Smith v. Illinois
Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587 (1926) (Court refused to require exhaustion because of the
two year agency- delay).
209. 393 U.S. 544 (1966).
210. 1d.
1979]
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by having matters decided at the agency level whenever feasible.
Additionally, primary jurisdiction is one means of avoiding adjudica-
tions inconsistent with agency determinations in an area in which an
agency has special expertise."' With respect to conservation of
judicial energy, again the unreasonable delays by the OFCCP and
unsatisfactory resolution of the complaints it receives weighs
against referral of an aspect of the suit to the agency.212 These fac-
tors arguably outweigh the burdens placed on the judicial system
because they threaten to undermine the rights which Section 503
guarantees.
Moreover, there is no compelling reason to defer to agency ex-
pertise in the Section 503 context. The OFCCP is not a highly
specialized agency delegated broad discretionary powers in a com-
prehensive scheme of regulation. Because applicants and employees
covered by the Act must be qualified to perform the essential job
functions in question, courts can apply traditional concepts of
discrimination. 1 The courts already possess a vast amount of ex-
perience in this type of discrimination, thereby obviating the need
to defer to agency expertise.
An appealing alternative to both exhaustion of administrative
remedies and primary jurisdiction was recently suggested in a law
suit brought by a private litigant under Section 504 of the Act. In
Whitaker v. City University of New York,2 14 the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare recognized a private right of action
211. See note 198 supra. In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton,
388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1974), a case involving enforcement of the National En-
vironmental Policy Act (NEPA) by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the court
refused to invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The court noted that it would
be less willing to consider the claims of the plaintiffs if the BLM had demonstrated
more diligence in pursuing its role. However, withholding a decision on the merits un-
til the BLM made a final determination, the court held, would thwart congressional in-
tent, reducing NEPA to a "paper tiger." Id. at 835-36. The court maintained that grant-
ing a stay of proceedings pending an agency decision was a matter that was within the
discretion of the court to be based on all the facts and circumstances presented. Id.
212. The fact that the OFCCP does not have broad discritionary powers in a
comprehensive scheme of regulation also distinguishes the Section 503 situation from
that presented to the court in Amtrack, discussed at notes 137 to 147, supr In
Amtrack, there was a clear danger that multiple litigation would undermine congres-
sional goals of increasing passenger service efficiency by discontinuing unprofitable
routes. 414 U.S. at 460-61. That danger is clearly not present under Section 503.
Rather than undermining congressional goals, private litigation will substantially ad-
vance them.
213. See text supra, at notes 42 to 49.
214. Whitaker v. City Univ. of New York, 77C-2258 (E.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 14,
1977).
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as a desirable and effective means of enforcing the non-discrimination
requirements of the companion to Section 503, Section 504, which
covers recipients of federal financial assistance. ' HEW opposed the
requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies, and
presumably primary jurisdiction, on the ground that the ad-
ministrative procedures are, like Section 503's, primarily designed to
enforce the terms of the contract between the government and the
recipients of federal funds. The remedy of cutting off these funds,
HEW maintained, was not an appropriate form of relief for individual
instances of discrimination. HEW nevertheless recognized that it
has an obligation to aid the court in interpreting the Section 504
regulations. To that end the Department had petitioned the court
for permission to enter the case as amicus curiae in order to present
to the court its interpretations of the regulations. ' A similar posi-
tion to that of HEW taken by the OFCCP would be persuasive to a
court faced with the issue under Section 503.
Although the OFCCP has not taken a position with respect to
private rights of action under Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act,
the view of HEW on Section 504 seems to be peculiarly appropriate.
This is especially true in light of the fact that Congress expressed a
strong desire that Sections 503 and 504 be interpreted
consistently."' Moreover, the OFCCP has already recognized that it
functions more effectively by conducting compliance reviews of con-
tractors than by processing individual complaints." The complaint
backlog and the apparent lack of commitment by the OFCCP also
suggests the lack of adequate relief from contractor non-compliance.
These factors suggest that the courts and the OFCCP should con-
sider amicus participation by the agency as an alternative to strict
application of the doctrines of exhaustion of remedies and primary
jurisdiction in a Section 503 lawsuit.
CONCLUSION
Section 503 of the Rehabilitation Act represents the most far-
reaching achievement of Congress to date in expanding employment
opportunities for handicapped persons in the private sector.
Although its application is limited to government contractors, the
pervasive influence of government contracts on the employment
215. Id.
216. Id. See Note, Implying Civil Remedies, supra note 117, at 294 n.63.
217. 120 CONG. REC. 30534 (1974).
218. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, COMPLIANCE REVIEW PROCEDURES, supra note 56,
19791
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market is indisputable. Moreover, the Department of Labor's broad
interpretation of the Act has contributed to its over-all impact. The
Section 503 non-discrimination mandate will clearly have an enor-
mous effect on employment opportunities for mentally and physical-
ly impaired persons.
Unfortunately, ineffective enforcement of Section 503 re-
quirements by the OFCCP threatens to undermine the aggressive
and far-reaching goals of the Act. The OFCCP has demonstrated
that it is both unwilling and incapable of enforcing the rights of hand-
icapped persons protected by Section 503. Instead, the agency has
focused on directed compliance reviews of government contractor's
affirmative action programs. Although directed compliance reviews
may be an effective means for eliminating blatant systematic viola-
tions of the non-discrimination requirements, these reviews do little
to either remedy the effects of past discrimination or to encourage
voluntary compliance. This lack of vigorous pursuit of individual
claims substantially lessens the benefits of the Act.
On the other hand, a handicapped individual has a number of
legal options which he may exercise to enforce his rights and
thereby accomplish the goals of the Act. One of these alternatives is
a mandamus action against the OFCCP to compel it to perform its
duties. However, the most effective enforcement tool which may be
available to plaintiffs is a direct civil action against a non-compliant
contractor on either an implied remedies or third party beneficiary
contract theory. The Act does not specifically provide for direct civil
actions against government contractors and there is no clear evi-
dence in the legislative history that one was intended. However, the
Supreme Court has taken the position that it is the duty of the
courts to adjust their remedies to ensure that the purposes of Con-
gress are not frustrated. The courts are now in an excellent position
to fulfill that duty by implying a private remedy under Section 503
or by permitting one on a third party beneficiary contract theory.
Eugene A. Schoon
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